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ABSTRACT:
Recent evidence in the decades-old Chevron/Ec-
uador litigation suggests that the $18 billion judgment
rendered against Chevron by an Ecuadorian court may
have been a product of conspiracy and fraud on an al-
most unprecedented scale. However, these allegations
overshadow fundamental problems in the method by
which U.S. courts determine whether judgments ren-
* Judge Lewis Kaplan, in his March 2014 ruling in the Racketeering and Corrupt
Influenced Organizations case brought by Chevron against the plaintiff’s attorney
Steven Donziger, used the phrase “What Happens in Ecuador Stays in Ecuador” to
refer to Donziger’s supposed assumption that evidence of potential fraud in the
case to enforce Ecuador’s judgment against Chevron would not be subject to
subpoena in the United States. See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF,
126, (S.D.N.Y. 2014) available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db
=special&id=379.
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dered in foreign jurisdictions may be enforced against de-
fendants in the United States.
Under the current jurisprudential regime, courts
that are faced with the question of whether a foreign
judgment is enforceable in the United States follow what
is termed the “international due process analysis.” In
this analysis, the court must render a value judgment on
the overall judicial process of the country handing down
the original decree, and decide whether the country gen-
erally affords due process in judicial proceedings. If so,
and if the U.S. court determines that the judicial system
in the country of origin is fundamentally fair, the judg-
ment will be upheld by U.S. courts. However, this analy-
sis raises a potentially troublesome issue because under
the guise of judicial efficiency, courts are free to focus
only on the foreign court system as a whole and disre-
gard the particular proceedings under which the judg-
ment was rendered. In essence, this means that courts
may completely ignore claims by defendants that they
did not receive due process in foreign proceedings. Fur-
ther, courts are afforded unbridled discretion to validate
foreign judgments without considering credible extrinsic
evidence regarding the political system of the country
where the judgment originated. Perhaps even more
troublesome is the fact that because U.S. courts are not
required to examine particular proceedings, this analysis
has the potential to increase fraudulent practices by for-
eign litigants in “fair judicial systems,” who anticipate
that unscrupulous tactics will not affect enforceability of
their judgments in the U.S.
The Chevron/Ecuador case concerns claims that
Texaco, which Chevron acquired in 2001, polluted the
Lago Agrio oilfield region of Ecuador by improperly
dumping billions of gallons of contaminants in the area.
After a court appointed expert reported widespread pol-
lution in the region, an Ecuadorian Court ordered Chev-
ron to pay $18 billion dollars in damages. When the
plaintiffs sought to collect the judgment in the U.S.,
Chevron challenged the ruling by the Ecuadorian Court,
eventually uncovering evidence that suggested the judg-
ment was a product of a widespread pattern of fraud and
conspiracy, including admissions of bribery by one of the
presiding Ecuadorian judges.
Paradoxically, the existing international due pro-
cess analysis suggests that a U.S. court determining
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whether to enforce the judgment should examine Ecua-
dor’s court system as a whole, rather than looking into
the particular proceedings under which the original
judgment was rendered. This article examines the back-
ground and application of the international due process
analysis, and suggests that rather than promoting judi-
cial efficiency, the existing analysis actually increases
the burden on U.S. courts determining the validity of a
foreign judgment, and also may lead to judicial incur-
sions foreign affairs, a territory normally reserved for
the Executive and Legislative Branches.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent ruling in the Chevron/Ecuador case has revived a
contentious debate by a number of widely disparate groups, from oil
companies and environmentalists, to foreign affairs experts and judi-
cial commentators.1 The litigation, now over 20 years old, brings a host
of legal, ethical and political questions into the spotlight, but in an
increasingly global society, perhaps one of the most important ques-
tions relates to how the United States will enforce judgments rendered
in foreign courts. Surprisingly, the scheme by which the enforceability
of these judgments is determined by U.S. courts is sadly lacking. Be-
cause of the unclear nature of the legal standards used to examine the
validity of judgments rendered abroad, judges may validate foreign
judgments rendered in proceedings that potentially contravene our no-
tions of fairness and judicial impartiality, but more importantly, may
1 See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF, 126, (S.D.N.Y. 2014) availa-
ble at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=379.
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 4  9-SEP-14 8:51
496 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
violate constitutional requirements and guarantees. The Chevron/Ec-
uador case provides an illustration of some of the difficult issues that
arise when the validity of a foreign judgment is suspect. Although it
has recently come to light that the multi-billion dollar judgment ren-
dered against Chevron was most likely a product of a widespread pat-
tern of fraud and bribery, the question remains as to whether litigants,
who may have been denied any semblance of a fair and impartial trial
in a foreign court, should be denied relief simply because the lens
through which we examine a foreign judgment is often colored by our
relationship with the country where it was rendered.
II. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN FOREIGN
NATIONS
Both federal and state courts have recently wrestled with the
question of the extent to which U.S. courts should consider interna-
tional law when applying domestic law.2 Similarly, U.S. courts have
increasingly had to contend with issues raised by recognizing judg-
ments rendered in foreign courts, particularly in civil matters. Specifi-
cally, in the absence of an existing international legal regime, such as
the International Criminal Court or an applicable treaty, what is the
extent to which the U.S. judiciary’s deference to the courts of other
nations obviates due process in proceedings rendered abroad? Judg-
ments rendered domestically normally pose little, if any, problems be-
cause the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are widely understood
to require uniform practices that, when followed by the conscientious
plaintiff, lead to the recognition of judgments by all other states via
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, found at Article IV §1 of the Consti-
tution.3 Taken together, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and its co-
rollary, the Due Process Clause, suggest that when the parties to a
legal controversy have an opportunity for a full and fair hearing by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the re-litigation of issues already de-
cided is not only wasteful of judicial resources, but would also impose
an unfair burden on the victor in the earlier proceeding.4 Generally,
Article IV §1 of the Constitution addresses the duties that the various
states have to honor the “public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other state.”5 However, the Supreme Court has noted that
there is a difference between the credit owed to a state’s legislative
2 Jacob Gershman, Oklahoma Ban on Sharia Law Unconstitutional, US Judge
Rules, LAWBLOG, WALL ST. J., (August 16, 2013) available at http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2013/08/16/oklahoma-ban-on-sharia-law-unconstitutional-us-judge-rules/.
3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
4 Robert Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution
45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
5 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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measures or common law, and the credit owed to judgments, which are
generally entitled to greater respect than the laws or statutes of other
states.6 Therefore, once a judgment is rendered, under the doctrine of
res judicata, the court sitting in the state where the judgment is
sought to be enforced can no longer review whether the original court
observed procedural due process requirements, as this kind of review
is precluded by the mandatory recognition of the original judgment.
Presumably, any procedural defects in the suit would have been re-
viewed and resolved by the court in the original proceedings, and liti-
gation of these issues would be barred in a subsequent trial. Further,
for judgments rendered in domestic courts, a subsequent court’s deter-
mination of whether a litigant has already had the opportunity for a
full and fair hearing is a fairly straightforward matter. Generally, a
comprehensive and shared legal scheme assures that the fairness
analysis is for the most part uniform, notwithstanding that proceed-
ings may occur in states thousands of miles apart. Therefore, upon
minimal inquiry into the adequacy of the judicial process of the state
where a judgment originated, the state where judgment is sought to be
enforced is constitutionally bound to give the same effect to judgments
as those proceedings would have in the state of their origin.7
International recognition of judgments between countries is ob-
viously much more problematic. The absence of any internationally
recognized analogue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (other than
that provided by international treaty) means that each nation is free to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments according to its own law, or to
refuse to consider recognition and enforcement altogether. In the
United States, the closest approximation of an international version of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is the Act of State Doctrine, which
dictates that the propriety of the decisions of other countries relating
to their internal affairs will not be questioned in the courts of the
United States.8 In its traditional formulation, the doctrine precludes
courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of public acts
that a recognized foreign sovereign power commits within its own ter-
ritory.9 While application of the doctrine is not required by statute, it
is a principle generally recognized and adhered to by federal courts
when examining the decisions of the agencies of foreign sovereigns.10
It is important to note that the underlying aim of the Act of State Doc-
trine is not based in comity, the principle that one nation will extend
certain courtesies to other nations through the recognition of the valid-
6 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
8 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
9 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408 (1964).
10 Id.
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 34 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 34 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-SEP-14 8:51
498 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
ity and effect of their executive, legislative, and judicial acts.11 Rather
the aim of the Act of State Doctrine is to preserve the separation of
powers between the Judicial and Executive branches.12 That is, the
purpose of the doctrine is not to protect other nations’ sovereignty from
interference by the United States, but rather to prevent the Executive
Branch’s prerogative of dictating foreign affairs from being frustrated
by a decision issued by the Judicial Branch.13
The Act of State doctrine gives rise to an additional complica-
tion, which is the fact that conflict of laws is generally regarded as a
matter of state, rather than federal law, with the consequence that
each state is free to make its own decision regarding recognition of a
foreign country’s judgments.14 However, although the recognition of
judgments generally has state-specific applicability, the complication
primarily arises when the controversy at hand may implicate foreign
relations. As the Supreme Court noted in Sabbatino, a 1964 case that
established that the policy of federal courts would be to honor the Act
of State Doctrine, the Court was “not without other precedent for a
determination that federal law governs; there are enclaves of federal
judge-made law which bind the States”. . .[t]he rules of international
law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state inter-
pretations.”15 Under the holding of Sabbatino, even though recognition
of foreign judgments in this country is generally governed by state law,
the Separation of Powers, Act of State and Political Question Doctrines
(and their underlying principles) would seemingly restrict state court
judges and also curtail the discretion of federal judges, when the for-
eign relations of the United States could be impaired by the applica-
tion of state judgment recognition law.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The Chevron/Ecuador case brings these issues screaming into
the spotlight, demanding particular attention to potential domestic en-
forcement of judgments rendered in the courts of other countries. As
the case continues to wind its way through the appeals process, it has
the potential to either reinforce or redefine the existing limits of com-
ity between the United States and Ecuador, as well as raise serious
questions about the extent to which the Judicial Branch can render
decisions that touch upon political relationships before it encroaches
11 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
12 See 376 U.S. at 423.
13 Id.
14 Nicor Int’l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
15 376 U.S. at 939.
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on the powers of the other branches.16 Under the current jurispruden-
tial regime, courts that are faced with the question of whether a for-
eign judgment is enforceable in the United States follow what is
termed the “international due process” analysis.17 In this analysis,
rather than re-examining foreign proceedings in which the judgment
was obtained, a U.S. court may render a value judgment on the overall
judicial system of the country handing down the original decree, and
decide whether the country generally affords due process in judicial
proceedings. If so, and the court determines that the court system in
the country of origin is fundamentally fair, the judgment will be up-
held by U.S. courts.18
This analysis raises a potentially troublesome issue because
under the guise of judicial efficiency, courts are free to focus only on
the foreign court system as a whole and disregard procedural issues in
the particular proceedings under which the judgment was rendered. In
essence, this means that courts may completely ignore claims by de-
fendants that they did not receive due process in foreign proceedings.
Professor Montre Carodine, in an in-depth examination of the interna-
tional due process analysis, has noted that rather than examining in-
dividual proceedings, courts are free to rely on “political evidence and
the judges’ own personal perceptions of the foreign countries.”19 Under
this analysis, an anomaly may occur wherein courts might enforce
judgments from foreign nations that generally provide due process,
even if the particular proceedings were void of the due process require-
ments that would be guaranteed under the Constitution in domestic
proceedings. However, judges are free to refuse to enforce judgments
from countries that may be considered “unfriendly” to U.S. interests
even if these countries afforded the defendants protections that exceed
constitutional due process requirements.
In addition, courts are afforded unbridled discretion with re-
spect to the extrinsic evidence they will consider concerning the fair-
ness of the judicial system of the judgment’s country of origin.20 It has
been contended that because the international due process analysis
rests solely with the judiciary, and may be subject to the personal bias
and determinations of the judge, it violates the Separation of Powers
Doctrine because it in effect allows courts to “set” foreign policy in
holdings that will bind subsequent courts considering similar issues.21
16 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 534, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d
470 (2d Cir. 2002).
17 Soc’y of Lloyds v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, (7th Cir. 2000).
18 See id. at 481.
19 See Montre Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2007).
20 See id. at 1207.
21 See id. at 1206–07.
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However, perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the interna-
tional due process analysis arises because U.S. courts are not required
to examine particular proceedings, which means this analysis has the
potential to increase fraudulent practices by foreign litigants in “fair
judicial systems,” who anticipate that unscrupulous tactics will not af-
fect the enforceability of their judgments in the U.S. For example,
American attorneys representing plaintiffs in foreign courts that gen-
erally afford fair proceedings have an incentive to exploit this weak-
ness through fraud or bribery, particularly if they believe that their
individual proceedings will receive minimal scrutiny. As counterintui-
tive as it may seem, the existing international due process analysis
may afford unscrupulous plaintiffs who choose their forums carefully
increased opportunities to tamper with individual proceedings, and
then have potentially fraudulent judgments enforced in the U.S. Al-
though this outcome seems implausible, both the Dole and Chevron
cases discussed below provide examples in which choosing to file in a
“fundamentally fair” country that only generally afforded due process
rights might have made a significant difference in the outcome of the
case.
IV. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
With all due respect to the memory of the late Reagan-era
Speaker of the House Tip O’ Neill, “politics” has rapidly become a
global concern.22 With the advent of the internet and communications
technology that allows instantaneous dissemination of information,
political developments in nearly every country are scrutinized and
evaluated on a global scale in real-time as they occur. As business and
commerce becomes increasingly globalized, developments in countries
the world over have both a concrete and abstract effect on the day-to-
day activities of the citizens of the United States.23 Similar to the so-
called “butterfly effect,” where a small change in one system has dras-
tic consequences in a seemingly unrelated system at a later date, polit-
ical developments in nearly every country are instantly noted,
22 Former Speaker of the U.S. House Tip O’Neill (b. December 12, 1912, d. Janu-
ary 5, 1994) coined the popular phrase “All Politics is Local,” which stands for the
principle that politicians must appeal to the concerns of their local constituents in
order to garner success. According to this theory, local issues and mundane con-
cerns drive political success, rather than broad theoretical or global issues or con-
cerns which may only have intangible effects on voters.
23 See generally Kristen Chick, Egypt’s Liberals Walk Out, Leaving Islamists to
Write a Constitution, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 28, 2012, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0328/Egypt-s-liberals-walk-
out-leaving-Islamists-to-write-a-constitution.
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 36 Side A      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 36 Side A      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-SEP-14 8:51
2014] INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 501
transmitted instantaneously via mass communication channels, and
the resultant potential global ramifications are calculated, outcomes
and effects are anticipated, and measures are put in place to either
foster or minimize the impact of these changes.24 While the “political”
branches of the federal government (the Legislative and Executive
Branches), have the staff and resources to make determinations of how
global events will shape U.S. foreign policy, the Judiciary should theo-
retically be insulated from the requirement of making or formulating
these foreign policy determinations based on constitutional and legal
norms. Under the Separation of Powers doctrine, the foreign affairs
power is, at least in theory, the exclusive domain of the Executive and
Legislative branches.25 However, it is often the Court itself that sets
the limits on the extent to which it may consider questions of foreign
affairs, and it does so through purely jurisprudential checks such as
the Political Question Doctrine.26 As in any self-policing system, not-
withstanding the appeals system, the judiciary is almost unrestricted
in its ability to step outside the bounds of its own self-imposed restric-
tions in the name of judicial interpretation. As corporations continue
to expand and conduct business on a global scale, it is virtually certain
that the judiciary will be called upon more and more to determine the
validity of judgments rendered in foreign courts. In this specific cir-
cumstance, under the existing international due process analysis,
courts are able to determine foreign policy, rather than interpret it, to
the extent that they may evaluate and render a value judgment on the
legal systems of foreign nations.
As noted above, the primary restraint on judicial incursions
into the sphere of other branches is the Separation of Powers Doctrine,
which is further encapsulated in the judicially created Political Ques-
tion Doctrine. The doctrine was first suggested in the landmark Mar-
bury v. Madison case, in which Chief Justice John Marshall described
a distinct type of Executive action, the political action, wherein an offi-
cial may exercise discretion.27 The Court built on this in Mitchell vs.
Maurer, noting that a federal court has a special obligation to “satisfy
itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts
in a cause under review.”28 Although the opinion seemed to suggest
that the court always has the final say in interpreting the constitution-
24 See generally Tim Mullaney, Gas Could Hit $8 on Iran Showdown, Experts Say,
USA TODAY, March 22, 2012, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/indus
tries/energy/story/2012-03-21/gas-prices-iran-strait-of-hormuz/53704546/1.
25 See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“[T]he conduct of . . .
foreign relations . . . is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legis-
lative [branches] . . . ”).
26 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1196.
27 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 164 (1803).
28 Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934).
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ally conferred powers of the branches, it might refuse to do so in cer-
tain situations where the questions were simply not within the courts’
expertise. Marshall suggested that these questions, although falling
squarely within the Court’s power to adjudicate, were better deter-
mined by the Executive branch, which is uniquely positioned to make
policy decisions. This notion was later refined and expanded in Baker
v. Carr, where Justice Brennan outlined the factors to be used by the
court in determining whether a question is more appropriate for reso-
lution by the political branches.29 Considerations such as a “textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it,” and “the impossibility of a court’s un-
dertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government” are several of the fac-
tors that play into the political question determination.30 These factors
would all seemingly come into play in the foreign affairs arena, which
is unquestionably the province of the Executive and Legislative
branches.31 However, realizing the potential to completely sideline the
judiciary in questions regarding foreign affairs, the Baker Court indi-
cated that invocation of the Political Question Doctrine was at the dis-
cretion of the Court. Although all questions involving foreign affairs
are potentially political questions, the Court stated that it would be a
mistake to “suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”32 Clearly however,
there are situations dealing with foreign relations where the question
falls into an area “textually . . . commit[ed] . . . to a coordinate political
department,” where the court’s involvement might demonstrate “a
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.”33 In for-
eign affairs, the Executive is often in the best position to determine the
state of relations between the United States and other nations, and
depending on the political and economic changes that occur within
those nations, foreign relations may necessitate adjustment on a mo-
ment’s notice notwithstanding any country’s given political or eco-
nomic stability. The Judiciary, therefore, often lacks both the expertise
and legitimate authority to determine foreign policy, as recognized by
the Court itself through application of the Political Question Doctrine,
which analysis should also be applicable to the international due pro-
cess analysis.
29 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
30 See id.
31 See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
32 See 369 U.S. at 211.
33 See id. at 217.
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V. UNDERPINNINGS OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MONEY
JUDGMENTS
However, courts have arrived at, and seemingly wholeheart-
edly embraced, the current iteration of the international due process
analysis through a series of notable cases. As it stands, the analysis
has evolved over time to the extent that it would be almost unrecogniz-
able to its original proponents. The analysis has its roots in the princi-
ple of comity, which is the principle that one jurisdiction will extend
certain courtesies to other nations through the recognition of the valid-
ity and effect of their executive, legislative, and judicial acts.34 How-
ever, the basic hope underlying comity is that other jurisdictions will
reciprocate the courtesy shown to them.35 Many statutes relating to
the enforcement of foreign judgments require that the judgments of a
particular jurisdiction will be recognized and enforced by a country
only to the extent that the originating country would recognize and
enforce the judgments rendered by the enforcing country. This concept
was perhaps most clearly outlined by the Supreme Court in the 1895
case of Hilton v. Guyot, which involved a French liquidator’s attempt
to collect on a judgment obtained in France against an American citi-
zen.36 In its landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the defendant-debtor, and refused to recognize the French judgment,
beginning with a discussion of the doctrine of comity. Comity, the court
noted, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on one hand, nor a
matter of mere courtesy and good will on the other, but is the “recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citi-
zens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”37
The court went on to review the treatment of foreign judgments in
other countries, and then announced its rule regarding the conclusive-
ness of foreign judgments:
[W]e are satisfied that, where there has been opportu-
nity for a full and fair trial abroad before a [foreign] court
of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regu-
lar proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appear-
ance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administra-
tion of justice between the citizens of its own country and
those of other countries, and there is nothing to show ei-
34 See John Kuhn Bleimaier, The Doctrine of Comity in Private International Law,
24 CATH. LAW 327 (1979).
35 See id. at 330.
36 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
37 See id. at 163–64.
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ther prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws
under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of
this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of
the case should not, in an action brought in this country
upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or
an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.38
Though the French judgment appeared to meet these requirements,
the Court nevertheless refused to recognize the judgment based on a
lack of reciprocity, because France did not at that time recognize
American judgments.39 Among western nations, France was one of the
last major countries that refused to recognize and enforce foreign judg-
ments in the absence of a complete reexamination of the merits, and
only began doing so approximately 70 years after Hilton was
decided.40
Hilton’s comity-based analysis for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments survives today, albeit in a drastically al-
tered form. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws drafted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act in 1962, and the American Bar Association approved it the
same year, and a majority of states have adopted the Uniform Act.41
States that have not adopted the Uniform Act usually rely on common
law principles, and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Re-
statement), which is also based on Hilton.42 Under both the Restate-
ment and the Uniform Act, if a party obtains a judgment outside the
United States but wishes to collect on it in the United States, that
party must have the judgment “recognized” in order for the judgment
to be enforceable.43 Courts will typically enforce a judgment that the
creditor seeks to have recognized, unless the judgment debtor estab-
lishes the applicability of one of the statutory grounds for non-recogni-
tion. These grounds are comprised of both mandatory grounds, which
absolutely prohibit judicial recognition, and discretionary grounds,
38 See id. at 202–03.
39 See id. at 227.
40 Kurt H. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money Judgments: One
Down and More to Go, 13 AM J. COMP. L. 72 (1964).
41 Carodine, Political Judging, supra note 20, at 1166.
42 See In re Breau, 565 A.2d 1044, 1049 (N.H. 1989) (referencing the common law
principles of Hilton v. Guyot, as well as section 481 of the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, adopted in 1987).
43 Steven M. Richman & Justin B. Richman, An Overview of Enforcement of For-
eign Orders and Judgments in American Courts, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, 13, Febru-
ary 2010.
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which allow the judge some amount of leeway.44 However, grounds
that the Act considers “discretionary” include situations such as when
the judgment was obtained by fraud or there is substantial doubt
about the integrity of the rendering court.45 The final discretionary
ground in the 2005 iteration of the Act include situations when the
specific proceedings are not compatible with the requirements of due
process of law.46 Remarkably, based on the plain wording of the Act,
this suggests that the judge has the discretion to recognize a poten-
tially fraudulent judgment and make it judicially enforceable, or to
recognize a judgment in spite of evidence that it was rendered in pro-
ceedings devoid of due process. Likewise, in spite of evidence sug-
gesting that the integrity of the rendering court has been
compromised, the judge has discretion on whether or not to enforce the
judgment, rather than the duty to dismiss the suit for enforcement.
Perhaps most troubling, however, are the “mandatory grounds”
for non-recognition which have given rise to the analysis which the
courts use today. These grounds suggest that a foreign judgment is not
conclusive if the judgment was rendered under a system which does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the re-
quirements of due process of law, the foreign court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, or the foreign court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter.47 As it evolved, however, the ex-
ception has become the rule: the “mandatory grounds” for non-recogni-
tion of a judgment have become the test by which to determine
whether a judgment will be recognized. The Hilton Court’s require-
ments of the opportunity for a full and fair trial before a foreign court
of competent jurisdiction conducted upon regular proceedings, the cita-
tion or voluntary appearance of the defendant, an impartial system of
jurisprudence treating all parties alike, and the lack of prejudice or
fraud in the court or the system of laws under which it sits are no
longer the primary aspects considered by the court in recognizing for-
eign judgments. Rather than those considerations, which appear likely
to accurately measure the fairness and validity of a foreign judgment,
the international due process analysis has been reduced to a single
determination by the court as to whether the judgment was rendered
“under a system which fails to provide impartial tribunals or proce-
dures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”48
Under this loose standard, a foreign judgment need only be rendered
under a system that generally provides impartial tribunals and proce-
44 2005 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4(c).
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b).
48 See id. at §§ 4(a)–(b).
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dures compatible with due process of law, as noted above. Signifi-
cantly, the system does not need to provide due process commensurate
with constitutionally guaranteed rights, but rather, the foreign proce-
dures simply have to reflect some vague approximation of due-process.
Courts have not required that the system in which the foreign proceed-
ings took place comply with constitutional benchmarks of due-process,
but rather, require only that the system generally affords proceedings
that are fundamentally fair.49 If the overall judicial system of the na-
tion rendering the judgment is considered “fair,” then fairness in an
individual case is not examined, allowing for potential recognition of
foreign judgments rendered in proceedings that would clearly violate
due process protections if they took place in a U.S. court.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS
ANALYSIS
The international due process analysis has been most clearly
defined by Judge Posner in the case Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden,
when he noted that foreign judgments from the United Kingdom need
not comport with American notions of due process to be enforceable in
the United States.50 Instead, Judge Posner held that foreign judg-
ments from the United Kingdom and other “civilized” countries need
only comply with a much looser standard, noting that the “interna-
tional concept of due process” is distinct from the notion of due process
that has emerged from American case law.51 Under this analysis, the
fact that a foreign court denied an individual judgment debtor due pro-
cess is inconsequential if the court feels that the country has a fair
judicial system, and it may, in the name of comity, enforce the judg-
ment against the judgment debtor. On the other hand, had the judg-
ment creditor obtained the judgment in a country that the court feels
has an unjust judicial systems, the court will completely disregard the
judgment.52 The Ashenden court emphasized that the entire “system”
must be unfair to preclude recognition, and expressed doubt as to the
viability of the “retail approach” which focuses on the particular pro-
ceedings.53 Also troubling is the suggestion that the analysis should
only require that the foreign procedures be “compatible” with due pro-
cess, rather than mirror the fundamental rights that would be consti-
tutionally guaranteed in domestic courts.54
49 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002).
50 Soc’y of Lloyds v. Ashenden 233 F.3d 473, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2000).
51 See id.
52 See id. at 481.
53 See id. at 477.
54 See id.
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The anomalies that arose under Ashenden and other related
Lloyd’s cases are ironic, because in 1977, the United States and the
United Kingdom did attempt to establish a bilateral treaty to govern
the recognition of judgments, and the proposal received preliminary
approval.55 However, despite numerous revisions and attempted com-
promises, the final adoption of this document never occurred, despite
the many similarities of the judicial process and a shared legal history.
It is almost unthinkable that a country that spawned so many of our
legal traditions would give rise to questions regarding the recognition
of judgments in which U.S. citizens were deprived of fundamental due
process rights, but the Lloyd’s cases were just such a situation.
The Lloyd’s cases concern Lloyd’s of London, established ap-
proximately 325 years ago and later incorporated in 1871. Lloyd’s is
not an insurance company as we would recognize one it in the United
States, but rather, is actually a marketplace itself, established as a
corporate body under the Act 1871 of the British Parliament.56 Lloyd’s
has historically been made up of individual financial backers, under-
writers, and members, which have been traditionally known as
“Names.” Names may be either individuals, partnerships of individu-
als or corporate investors, all of which come together under the aegis of
Lloyd’s to pool and spread risk.57 Lloyd’s generally raises capital
through soliciting investments, but in order to invest in Lloyd’s under-
writing activities, an individual or corporation must first become a
Name by entering into an agency relationship with a Lloyd’s employee,
known as “Member’s Agents.” Further, to become a Name, investors
must demonstrate a particular level of financial worth, and then must
deposit their investment amount in the form of a letter of credit issued
in favor of Lloyd’s. The Members Agent then invests this money in one
or more “syndicates,” which is the general term for the risk-relation-
ship between the entities that are performing the actions which are
sought to be insured, and the group of investors who insure that risk.58
Syndicates typically write business and insure risks for only one year,
at the end of which the syndicate ceases to exist as an ongoing trading
entity. However, after the year lapses, there is a lag time of two more
years allowed for claims to come in and be settled, and at the end of
55 Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between
the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421 (1976).




57 Introduction to Lloyd’s: Background, HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS, available at
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/llmanual/LLM1010.htm.
58 “What Lloyd’s Insures”, About Lloyd’s, LLOYD’S.COM, available at http://www
.lloyds.com/lloyds/about-us.
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the third year, each syndicate closes its accounts, and the Names re-
ceive their share of the profits, or pay their share of the losses, and
their liability comes to an end. Most importantly, until all claims are
received and paid, a syndicate cannot close its accounts and distribute
profits, and pending that closure, Names are liable without limit for
their shares in the syndicates in which they invest. Each Name
pledges his entire personal wealth to back up his share in the syndi-
cate’s insurance policies.59 Historically, this potential inability of a
syndicate to close its accounts in a timely fashion and then distribute
profits had drastically reduced the appeal of investing in syndicates. In
order to counter this, and generate interest by investors, Lloyd’s insti-
tuted the practice of having reserves calculated to cover any outstand-
ing claims that might come in against the syndicates, which allowed
Lloyd’s to maintain the schedule of closing accounts and declaring
profits (or losses) at the end of the third year. At the time of closing
actuaries calculate and set aside estimated reserves to cover the costs
of both claims that have been notified but not yet paid, and potential
claims which may have been incurred but not reported, and the costs
of the reserves are then deducted from the syndicate’s profits, and the
syndicate is allowed to close at the end of the third year.60
Lloyd’s motto, Uberrimae fidei, is Latin for “of the utmost good
faith,” which is ironic in the eyes of many after a series of states and
individual investors alleged fraud by Lloyd’s on a massive scale, which
led to multiple lawsuits and tested the outer limits of both comity and
international judgment recognition. Over time, it was discovered that
Lloyd’s three-year business model was completely ineffective in deal-
ing with risks that could be categorized as “long tail” risks, where the
liabilities related to an occurrence may not become known for years, or
perhaps even decades later. These types of risks often led to an insur-
ing syndicate’s reserves being vastly inadequate to cover later claims,
which also led to resistance to doing business with Lloyd’s from the
perspective of the insured. To maintain the appeal of investing in
Lloyd’s on both the Name and insured sides, Lloyd’s developed a
scheme called “Reinsurance to Close” that allowed a syndicate to close
in any event after three years and declare a result based only on the
claims that had been made within the three year time limit. However,
it would then package the entire portfolio of policies from that closed
syndicate with a set amount of reserves to cover potential future
claims against these policies, and pass them on to new syndicates that
59 See How is Risk Placed at Lloyd’s, LLOYD’S.COM (last visited May 7, 2014), http:
//www.lloyds.com/lloyds/about-us/what-we-do/placing-risk.
60 LLM2020, Syndicate Accounts: Accounting Rules until 2004: Three-Year Ac-
counting, HMRC.GOV.UK (last visited April 14, 2012), available at http://www
.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/llmanual/LLM2020.htm.
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were still active. These active syndicates, now saddled with potential
future claims from “inherited” policies, used the calculated reserves to
buy reinsurance policies to cover any losses that might arise from any
future claims, which effectively shifted the risk from the syndicates to
the reinsurer. However, Lloyd’s quickly discovered several problems
with this structure. First, calculating the amount of reserves neces-
sary to cover hypothetical future claims is a difficult and often inaccu-
rate process, and so the amount of reinsurance purchased to cover
future liability was often grossly inadequate once the claims mani-
fested. Second, because the Names were personally liable without
limit if the reinsurance amount was inadequate, the structure was
similar to a “Ponzi” scheme, in the sense that early investors were able
to take profits while passing risks along to subsequent investors.61
That is, as the portfolios were transferred forward year after year, the
investors in the most recent syndicate became personally liable for all
of the latent liabilities of its predecessor syndicates, and unless the
reserves (in the form of reinsurance) passed on were adequate to pay
potential future claims, the result of using this system was to create a
“time bomb” of liability.62 The system was a perfect breeding ground
for fraud, because profits taken as a syndicate closed were directly re-
duced by the reserves calculated, which in turn influenced the amount
of reinsurance purchased. This encouraged intentionally underesti-
mating reserves, which would then require a lower amount of reinsur-
ance to be purchased, and maximize present profits. Further, many of
the Names solicited during this time period claim that they were led to
believe that the very existence of Reinsurance to Close ended their lia-
bility at the end of the three year syndicate period, and that they were
completely unaware of the potential liability from inadequate
reinsurance.63
In the 1980s, when Lloyd’s governing committee learned of the
potential future liability posed by the hazards of asbestos and other
61 See Richard Thomson, Two Men Who Lost a Billion: Names in the Lloyd’s Syn-
dicates Run by Anthony Gooda and Derek Walker are Facing Ruin. Richard Thom-





62 Courtland H. Peterson, Choice Of Law And Forum Clauses and the Recognition
of Foreign Country Judgments Revisited Through the Lloyd’s of London Cases, 60
LA. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000).
63 Jamie Dunkley, Lloyds Names Face Bankruptcy as Court Battle Ends, THE TEL-
EGRAPH, June 4, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksand
finance/insurance/5446813/Lloyds-Names-face-bankruptcy-as-court-battle-ends
.html.
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pollutants, they realized that many of the most profitable syndicates,
which many members of the governing committee had personally in-
vested in, faced losses on a scale that would literally destroy Lloyd’s as
a functioning entity.64 A report was generated that recommended that
new Names be actively recruited so that additional assets would be
available to meet impending losses, and that recruitment be facilitated
by reducing the assets which each Name had to prove in order to es-
tablish membership. This would serve to bring in thousands of new
Names, which would dilute impending losses by actively passing costs
on to the new Names. In 1972 Lloyd’s had begun soliciting Americans
to be Names, and continued to do so during the late 1970s and 1980s,
but although the governing committee knew of the pending disaster
from long-tail asbestos claims, the new Names were not informed of
the probable liability they faced.65 More importantly, they were not
told that their liability was both several and unlimited. In essence,
expanding the numbers of Names functioned to provide more assets to
absorb the impending losses, while allowing insiders to avoid future
liability by surreptitiously leaving the at-risk syndicates. In fact, dur-
ing this period, some of the Names were repeatedly assured of the
safety of their investment, and were actually urged to increase their
investment in the syndicates.66
In the early 1980s, Lloyd’s sought to take measures to protect
itself from litigation, and succeeded in obtaining a new ‘private act’ of
the British Parliament, entitled the Lloyd’s Act of 1982, which pro-
vided Lloyd’s with immunity from legal liability, and further, stripped
the ability of the Names to regulate themselves by establishing a gov-
erning committee known as the Council of Lloyd’s.67 Lloyd’s began re-
quiring all Names to sign contracts in which they agreed to comply
with the Lloyd’s Act, and which included choice-of-forum and choice-of-
law clauses under which they agreed that all legal disputes would be
brought in English courts and decided under English law.68 The
Names were not informed of the extent and implications of these
changes until much later when losses in the billions of dollars became
known. The choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses proved to be crit-
ical in the litigation in American courts during the 1990s, when the
Names became individually liable for the massive losses from the rein-
surance scheme.69 The Lloyd’s Act authorized the Council to appoint
64 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2000).
65 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 98 C 5335, 1999 WL 284775 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23,
1999) aff’d sub nom. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Ashenden].
66 See id.
67 See id at 2.
68 See id.
69 Ashenden v. Lloyd’s of London, 96 C 852, 1996 WL 717464 1,1 (1996).
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“substitute agents,” who would have the power “to act on behalf of
members for the proper regulation of the business of insurance at
Lloyd’s.”70 When Lloyd’s experienced over $12 billion in losses during
the 1980s and early l990s, and the Names were unable to meet their
contribution requirements, Lloyd’s entered into a series of settlement
agreements with the Names, under which Lloyd’s and the Names who
agreed to settle exchanged mutual releases of liability and waivers of
claims.71 The majority of the Names accepted the settlement plan in
1996, although a substantial number of the Names refused to do so. In
accordance with the settlement plan, all of the Names, including those
who rejected the settlement, were offered the opportunity to purchase
reinsurance. Significantly, even those Names that did not participate
in the settlement agreements were covered by the reinsurance, but the
Names who refused to settle were not included in the “mutual waiver
of claims.”72 Further, there were provisions in the settlement plan that
shielded Lloyd’s from being tangled in extended litigation. Specifically,
Names could not claim any offset against Lloyd’s and could not dispute
the amount of their reinsurance premiums in any lawsuits brought by
Lloyd’s to collect the reinsurance premiums. To ensure that these pro-
visions were enforceable against the non-settling Names, the Council
appointed a “substitute agent” to sign the reinsurance contract on
their behalf pursuant to the Lloyd’s Act.73 Non-settling Names sought
to challenge Lloyd’s ability to enact the settlement plan, as well as
specific provisions of the reinsurance contract in court in the United
Kingdom. However, the British courts affirmed Lloyd’s power to enact
the settlement plan, and upheld the validity of the clause which pre-
vented the Names from claiming any set-offs from the reinsurance pre-
mium, including damages for fraud.74 Additionally, the British courts
also upheld what was termed a “conclusive evidence” clause of the re-
insurance contract, which stated that whatever Lloyd’s determined the
premium amount to be was automatically conclusive evidence between
the Names and the reinsurer, and the Names would simply be liable
for whatever amount Lloyd’s set.75
When Lloyd’s sought to enforce provisions in the contracts
against American Names by billing them for mounting losses, the sub-
sequent cases highlighted the fraudulent misrepresentations that
Lloyd’s had used in order to generate capital in order to dilute its
losses. The defendants in Ashenden were a husband and wife who re-
70 Ashenden, 98 C 5335 at 2.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 2–3.
73 See id. at 3.
74 See id.
75 See id.
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sided in Illinois, James and Mary Jane Ashenden. The Ashendens
were separately recruited to become Names in 1977 and in 1984 by a
Managing Agent, and they initially invested $70,000 after being as-
sured that Lloyd’s was an esteemed and time-honored institution that
only invested in “conservative risks.”76 The Managing Agent continued
to reassure the Ashendens regarding the security of their investment
in Lloyd’s, and they invested even more in Lloyd’s, never having been
informed that they faced tremendous impending losses because of as-
bestos claims. In 1991, Lloyd’s called on the Ashendens to help cover
increasing losses sustained by the syndicates, who insured policies
that had been successively reinsured without adequate reserves, some-
times dating as far back as the 1930s.77 Lloyd’s made demand upon
the Ashenden’s letters of credit to cover the losses, and the Ashendens,
in addition to over forty other Illinois Names, ultimately sued Lloyd’s
and several of its agents in state court, arguing that Lloyd’s had vio-
lated Illinois securities and consumer protection laws.78 Lloyd’s re-
moved the case to federal district court, and the district court
dismissed the case, ruling that the Names were subject to the choice of
law and forum clauses as outlined in the settlement plan.79 Subse-
quently, Lloyd’s sent the Ashendens copies of the settlement plan,
which included “finality statements” that set forth demands from each
of them for the balance that they owed from their underwriting liabili-
ties, and from their shares of the reinsurance premium. Lloyd’s de-
manded $179,430 from James Ashenden and $222,668 from Mary
Jane Ashenden, but stated that their individual liabilities would be
reduced to $100,000 each if they executed the mutual releases.80 The
Ashendens refused the settlement offer, and they instructed their
agent not to sign the reinsurance agreements for them. But as noted,
Lloyd’s had made the reinsurance payments for all of the Names, in-
cluding payment on behalf of the non-settling Names, like the
Ashendens, who had also refused to sign the reinsurance contract.
Lloyd’s then sued those Names, including the Ashendens, in the
United Kingdom, and was able to get default judgments because of the
waiver and “conclusive evidence” clauses.81 The British court denied
the Names leave to appeal, and so the British judgment was final,
valid, and enforceable.
Lloyd’s then sought to have the judgments recognized in the
United States. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner began
76 See id. at 4.
77 See id.
78 Ashenden v. Lloyd’s of London, 934 F. Supp. 992, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
79 See id.
80 See Ashenden, 98 C 5335 at 4.
81 See id.
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his analysis by outlining Illinois’s version of the Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which allows that a for-
eign judgment is unenforceable if rendered by a court outside the
United States and the judgment was “rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”82 The court found the word “sys-
tem” fatal to the Ashendens’ position.83 Judge Posner noted that the
judgments against the defendants were obtained in Great Britain’s
High Court, “which corresponds to our federal district courts; they
were affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which corresponds to the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals; and the Appellate Committee of the House of
Lords, which corresponds to the U.S. Supreme Court, denied the de-
fendants’ petition for review.”84 Posner unequivocally declared that
“[t]he courts of England are fair and neutral forums,”85 and asserted
that “[a]ny suggestion that this system of courts does not provide im-
partial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law’ borders on the risible.”86 He further asserted that
British courts “are highly regarded for impartiality, professionalism,
and scrupulous regard for procedural rights.”87 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the Illinois Judgment Recognition Act provided that
only the system under which a foreign judgment was entered be “com-
patible with” American notions of due process, not identical.88 Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, there was no “serious question” that the United
Kingdom’s judicial system comports with the international concept of
due process.89
The Court rejected the Ashenden’s argument that it should ex-
amine the particular proceedings in which Lloyd’s obtained the judg-
ments against them, rather than looking only at the British judicial
system generally.90 However, because of the Illinois Act’s focus on the
“system”, Posner concluded that the Act did not call for “a retail ap-
proach”, which he stated would be inconsistent with providing a
streamlined, expeditious method for collecting judgments rendered by
courts in other jurisdictions, and which would, in effect give the judg-
ment creditor a further appeal on the merits.91 However, Judge Posner








89 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1183.
90 See Ashenden, 223 F. 3d at 476.
91 See id.
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Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Congo, or some other nation whose ad-
herence to the rule of law and commitment to the norm of due process
are open to serious question,” the Court may have considered the type
of evidence needed to show a denial of international due process.92
This statement highlights the major flaw in the international
due process analysis, that whether an individual’s claim that due pro-
cess rights were violated are measured against applicable sets of stan-
dards that are wholly at the discretion of the presiding judge, and
their personal perception of the country that the judgment was ren-
dered in. It is generally believed that Lloyd’s engaged in fraud on a
massive scale, but more disturbing is the fact that because of this
fraud, the Ashendens were deprived of rights that, if this situation had
occurred in the United States, would have been guaranteed under the
Constitution, and the actions of Lloyd’s would have subjected it to
criminal prosecution. However, under this analysis, Lloyd’s not only
perpetrated fraud, but was then allowed to sue, as judgment creditors,
the very people they had defrauded. In the United States, one of the
most fundamental requirements of procedural due process is “the op-
portunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.”93 However, the U.S. court ignored the fact that the British Court
entered a judgment against the Ashendens for the reinsurance premi-
ums even though the Ashendens never had any real opportunity to
contest these figures. The figures were calculated solely at Lloyd’s dis-
cretion, with no other proof of their validity other than the fact that
Lloyd’s chose the amount of the assessment, and under the “conclusive
evidence” provision, the Court unquestioningly accepted that as the
amount of the debt owed. By focusing solely on the Ashenden’s con-
tract with Lloyd’s, the Seventh Circuit enforced a judgment entered by
British court without affording the Ashendens any meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard or challenge the claims brought against them. In
essence, the Court’s decision meant that the standardized contracts
the Ashendens signed when they became Names granted Lloyd’s the
power to appoint substitute agents, chosen for the sole purpose of uni-
laterally waiving the Names’ rights to challenge the very fraud that
led them to become Names initially.94 The Ashendens were left with
no ability to challenge a settlement agreement entered on their behalf,
and specifically against their wishes, and moreover, were left with no
meaningful opportunity to raise claims of fraud nor any other defenses
against Lloyd’s.
The Ashenden case is significant for its clear application of the
international due process analysis, which, as it stands, seems to be
92 See id.
93 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
94 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1184.
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fundamentally flawed. It allows for a potential deprivation of due pro-
cess that when challenged, will look only to whether the entire judicial
system is, in the court’s view, fundamentally fair, and courts may pass
judgment on other judicial systems with little or no evidentiary bases
for their assessments. Judge Posner himself presumed the fairness of
the British system without any significant, in-depth procedural analy-
sis.95 However, he also suggested that courts might label other coun-
tries as fundamentally “uncivilized,” and following this holding, might
similarly pass judgment on those countries without meaningful analy-
sis.96 Some authors have suggested that this scheme not only encour-
ages, but indeed requires, courts to look the other way when presented
with questionable and possibly fraudulent judgments from favored
countries, and this favored status need not reflect the opinion of the
Executive branch in any fashion, but rather, the opinion of the court
itself.97
VII. THE CHEVRON/ECUADOR LITIGATION
The Ashenden case was decided in 2000, but the international
due process analysis has been also been playing out to some extent in
litigation that dates back into the 1990s. It involves a situation that is
reminiscent of the Lloyd’s case, but in this case, rather than misrepre-
sentation and failure to disclose by the plaintiff, the behaviors of the
plaintiffs involve widespread fraud and bribery on an almost unprece-
dented level.98 The case involves political corruption, fabricated evi-
dence, manipulation and threats against the Ecuadorian judiciary,
and other conduct so egregious that the U.S. judge hearing the case to
enforce a judgment handed down by the Ecuadorian court found the
plaintiff’s attorney, Steven Donziger, liable for coercion, bribery and
other violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act.99 It is still unknown whether the recent ruling in the federal
95 Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476–78.
96 See id.
97 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1188.
98 References to fraud, bribery, racketeering and other wrongdoing by plaintiffs’
attorneys in the Chevron/Ecuador litigation are based on Judge Kaplan’s ruling
in Chevron v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691, 17–20, (S.D.N.Y.Mar. 4, 2014), available
at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=379. It is impor-
tant to note that this ruling is subject to appeal and plaintiffs’ attorneys may be
cleared of any wrongdoing. However, this would not change the fundamental pre-
mise of this paper regarding the shortcomings of the existing international due
process analysis.
99 Michael Goldhaber, Judge Kaplan Lays Into Plaintiffs in Ecuador Suit Against
Chevron, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/law/article.jsp?id=1202474516910&Judge_Kaplan_Lays_Into_Plaintiffs_in_Ec
uador_Suit_Against_Chevron.
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district court could result in proceedings seeking the plaintiff’s attor-
ney’s disbarment, but the District Court, in examining statements by
the plaintiff’s attorney, stated, “it is relevant to note that Donziger is a
member of the New York Bar. His conduct, whether in the United
States or in Ecuador, was subject in every respect to the New York
rules governing the conduct of lawyers.”100 Although this ruling is re-
cent as of March 2014, even in the face of early evidence that the origi-
nal suit and the resulting judgment were potentially based on
fabricated evidence and fraud, the suit to enforce the judgment has
laboriously wound its ways through U.S. courts for years. The Chev-
ron/Ecuador litigation is significant because it raises questions about
the admissibility of expert testimony and evidence that is rendered or
gathered abroad, particularly when used to support damage awards in
countries that are subject to frequent regime change, and political or
economic instability, leading to unstable governments. These countries
are typically governed by regimes that are semi-dictatorial, and often
subject to allegations ranging from bureaucratic ineptitude to wide-
spread corruption.101 Ecuador, where the judgment was rendered in
this case, is currently governed by a regime that is considered both
politically and economically unstable. The country is marked by hav-
ing had eight presidents in the last twelve years; 40% of its population
living in poverty and another 13% live in extreme poverty; and its cur-
rent President is a socialist with strong ties to Venezuela’s late presi-
dent Hugo Chavez.102 However, under any theory of natural law or
social justice, the fact that the government of a country might be cor-
rupt should not serve to deprive its citizens of remedies in court
against U.S. companies who have intentionally and validly wronged
them. Likewise, the fact that a country has a beneficent government
should not diminish the need to protect the due process rights of U.S.
citizens or companies who may be innocent of wrongdoing. As the
world moves towards a more global economy, the resulting rise in
transnational litigation such as Chevron/Ecuador suggests that the
international due process analysis’ focus on judging the entire judicial
system of a country may require closer examination.
The original Chevron/Ecuador lawsuit concerns accusations by
approximately 30,000 plaintiffs that Texaco, which Chevron acquired
in 2001, dumped billions of gallons of contaminated water in and
100 See Chevron, No. 11 Civ. 0691 at 20.
101 Sophie Brown, Report: Political Instability on the Rise, CNN, Dec. 12, 2013,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/11/business/maplecroft-political-risk/.
102 CLARE SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21687, ECUADOR: POLITICAL AND EC-
ONOMIC SITUATION AND U.S. RELATIONS (2008).
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around the Ecuadorian region of Lago Agrio.103 During the period that
the lawsuit has been in the court system, six separate Ecuadorian
judges have been involved in the case, and “one federal judge in New
York died before he could make a ruling.”104 The case, perhaps the
largest environmental lawsuit in history, aside from the 2010 Deepwa-
ter Horizon spill, has once again brought the question of the recogni-
tion of international judgments to the foreground. After an Ecuadorian
judge rendered an $18 billion damage award against Chevron (later
reduced to $9.5 billion), the company vowed to continue fighting the
lawsuit, claiming that the plaintiffs’ case had no merit and was based
on fabricated evidence and testimony.105 Chevron continuously main-
tained the lawsuit was a scheme by the plaintiff’s attorney, Steven
Donziger, to whip up a frenzy of support among the media and envi-
ronmental groups so that Chevron would eventually settle just to end
the case.106 Significantly, Donziger was successful in eliciting substan-
tial financial support, and eventually it was discovered that the plain-
tiff’s case had been underwritten by a number of investors including a
large plaintiff’s firm based in Philadelphia that was not involved in the
suit, but which sought to collect a portion of the judgment.107
The plaintiffs’ claims stem from Texaco’s participation in an ex-
ploration and production venture with Petroecuador, Ecuador’s state-
owned oil company, in the 1970s. Texaco was a minority partner, and
representatives from Chevron claimed that “the production operation
took place primarily on government lands and was conducted in com-
pliance with Ecuadorian laws and regulations.”108 Chevron produced
approximately 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil, and it alleged that the
Government of Ecuador received 95% of the financial proceeds.109 The
resulting oil production and exports were so profitable that Ecuador’s
per-capita GDP doubled within a single decade, and even today, oil
exports still provide the bulk of public revenues.110 Attorneys initiated
the original litigation in August 1993 in Texas state court. The case
103 Bryan Walsh, An Oily Case: Chevron’s Never-Ending, Record-Breaking Law-
suit in Ecuador, TIME, Jan. 2012, available at http://science.time.com/2012/01/09/
an-oily-case-chevrons-never-ending-record-breaking-lawsuit-in-ecuador/.
104 Id.
105 Dominic Rushe and Rory Carroll, Chevron Fined over $8 Billion over Amazon
“Contaminations”, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 2014, available at http://www.theguar
dian.com/business/2011/feb/14/chevron-contaminate-ecuador.
106 Jessica M. Karmasek, Pressure Placed on Chevron to Settle Ecuador Lawsuit,
LEGAL NEWSLINE, May 25, 2011, available at http://legalnewsline.com/issues/class-
action/232868-pressure-placed-on-chevron-to-settle-ecuador-lawsuit.
107 Daniel Fisher, Chevron’s $27 Billion Problem, FORBES, July 13, 2009.
108 CHEVRON IN ECUADOR, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/.
109 Id.
110 Walsh, supra note 104.
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was subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Sequihua v. Texaco.111 The plaintiffs alleged that,
rather than safely disposing of the byproducts of oil exploration and
production, Texaco simply dumped the byproducts into large open pits,
and left hundreds of these pools behind when the company’s contract
ended and it left the country.112 The attorneys for the plaintiffs
brought claims based on property damage, personal injuries, and “in-
creased risk of disease due to negligent or otherwise improper oil pip-
ing and waste disposal practices.”113 In addition to monetary relief, the
plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Texaco to “return the land to
its former condition” and the imposition of a “trust fund” to be admin-
istered by the Court.114 Attorneys for Texaco denied these charges,
and offered evidence that Texaco’s operations were in line with the
law, as well producing evidence that Texaco had completed a $40 mil-
lion remediation and public works program supervised, inspected and
approved by the Government of Ecuador.115 Texaco claimed that after
it ceased operations, the Government of Ecuador had granted Texaco a
full and complete release of all further claims, liabilities and obliga-
tions.116 The plaintiffs also attempted to tie birth defects and cancer to
the waste, while Texaco claimed that there had been no proven health
effects from the pollution, and that in any event, they had remediated
their share of any pollution and were shielded from liability by the
releases from Government of Ecuador.117
The Sequihua court subsequently dismissed the suit fewer
than five months later on grounds of international comity and forum
non conveniens.118 However, in November of 1993, the plaintiff’s filed
a concurrent suit in Southern District of New York (the judicial dis-
trict encompassing Texaco’s corporate headquarters), in which the
judge allowed the plaintiffs the opportunity, through discovery and
otherwise, to attempt to ascertain the scope of Texaco’s alleged in-
volvement in the pollution, and to prove that the litigation belonged in
111 Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
112 Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe
?currentPage=all.
113 Christina Weston, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses
as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability For Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L.
REV 731, 732 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
114 Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
115 Chevron in Ecuador, supra note 111; Walsh, supra note 104.
116 Chevron in Ecuador, supra note 111.
117 Walsh, supra note 104.
118 Sequihua 847 F. Supp. 61, 62.
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U.S. courts.119 This suit, Aguinda v. Texaco, was also subsequently
dismissed on the grounds of international comity and forum non con-
veniens, as well as the failure to join indispensible parties - namely,
the Republic of Ecuador, and Petroecuador, the state-run oil company
which conducted all operations since Texaco left the country in
1992.120 However, on appeal in Jota v. Texaco, Inc. (which consoli-
dated the Ecuadorian case with a case filed by Peruvian plaintiffs who
lived downstream from the affected area), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the district court’s dismissal on grounds of forum
non conveniens and comity was erroneous in the absence of any condi-
tion requiring the oil company to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador,
and that the district court’s reasoning regarding the plaintiffs’ failure
to join the Republic of Ecuador as an indispensable party was only
applicable to the part of the complaint that “sought to enjoin activities
currently under Republic’s control.”121 The Second Circuit, possibly
seeking to relieve district courts of complex examinations of jurisdic-
tional issues when transferring to foreign courts, had noted in earlier
cases that a conditional dismissal obviated the need for an extensive
inquiry into foreign jurisdictional law, reasoning that if the foreign
court refused to take jurisdiction, the plaintiff would “still [be] pro-
tected by the conditional nature of the dismissal.”122 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Southern District of New
York for proceedings in line with its decision.123
At this point it may be appropriate to discuss a discrepancy
initially noted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Jota. The
court noted that the litigation had taken a curious turn at this point:
the litigation was proceeding under the unusual context of a foreign
country, the Republic of Ecuador, initially expressing vigorous opposi-
tion to the maintenance of this litigation in a United States court and
then, after a change in the government, just as vigorously urging that
the litigation proceed here.124 Remarkably, the court noted that al-
though the Republic of Ecuador had originally considered the suit an
affront to their sovereignty, after the regime change the Ecuadorian
government had urged that “only the adjudication of jurisdiction in the
claim filed by Ecuadorians . . . in a federal court of N.Y. against the
Texaco Company, [would] bring to those affected the possibility of find-
ing just treatment and a solution to the serious situation that they are
119 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) vacated sub nom.
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
120 See Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 627.
121 Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
122 Calavo Growers of California v. Generali Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir.
1980).
123 Id.
124 Jota, 157 F.3d at 155.
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going through.”125 This point underscores the fact that the Chevron/
Ecuador litigation may stand for one of the great “ironies” in the field
of law to date. The attorneys for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs brought suit
in the U.S. because of expanded remedies such as punitive damages,
expanded procedural opportunities such as broad discovery tools, and
the right to a jury trial on issues of fact.126 The plaintiffs, and eventu-
ally the Republic of Ecuador, fought to keep the litigation in the
United States, quite possibly because of the potential for a huge mone-
tary award from a sympathetic U.S. jury. Texaco, wanting to avoid the
suit all together, in what may have possibly been one of the largest
miscalculations in the history of corporate law, repeatedly brought mo-
tions to dismiss under forum non conveniens grounds, seeking to have
the case transferred to Ecuador.127 The practical effect of a forum non
conveniens dismissal is significant – in the overwhelming majority of
cases, a forum non conveniens dismissal is a clear victory for a defen-
dant because it forces plaintiffs to either settle for insignificant
amounts or abandon their efforts, particularly if the courts in the
country to which the suit would be transferred do not historically
award huge tort judgments.128
Texaco was well within reason to assume that, once it estab-
lished that Ecuador provided a more appropriate forum, the suit would
fall by the wayside. Because Ecuador was traditionally pro-defendant,
large companies such as Texaco would naturally anticipate that they
would be able to take advantage of a better bargaining position and
settle the case quickly, or have the case dismissed entirely.129 The Se-
quihua court undertook a detailed analysis to determine whether Ec-
uador was an adequate alternative forum, eventually granting the
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.130 The Aguinda
Court following the reasoning of the Sequihua court, found the obsta-
cles to maintaining U.S. jurisdiction even more persuasive, and also
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.131 As noted above, on ap-
peal, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
finding that the failure of the District Court to require Texaco to sub-
mit to in personam jurisdiction in Ecuador to be reversible error.132
During all of the initial U.S. proceedings, the plaintiffs continuously
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Id.
127 Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 62.
128 Weston, supra note 114, at 741.
129 Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Con-
veniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 100 COL. L. REV. 1444 (2011).
130 Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 65.
131 Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) vacated, sub nom. Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
132 Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998).
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protested the transfer of the litigation to Ecuador.133 In perhaps the
most prescient arguments of the entire litigation, the plaintiffs, who
would eventually triumph in Ecuador, introduced evidence showing
that “the Ecuadorian courts were subject to corrupting influences and
outside pressures, especially from the military, that rendered them in-
adequate to dispense independent, impartial justice in these cases.”134
It was only on remand to the Southern District of New York,
that anyone in the judiciary began expressing misgivings about the
ability of the Ecuadorian Court system to render a fair decision in this
case.135 Noting that the plaintiffs themselves initially raised issues of
lingering corruption in the Ecuadorian court system in their forum
non conveniens argument, the District Court stated that the events
surrounding the regime change in Ecuador had revived lingering ques-
tions about the ability of the Ecuadorian (and Peruvian) courts to “dis-
pense independent, impartial justice in these cases.”136
It is interesting to note that the reason the “fairness” of the
Ecuadorian court system was at issue during these proceedings is be-
cause, like the international due process analysis, the forum non con-
veniens analysis also requires judges to assess the appropriateness of
the alternative forum.137 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
clarified the type of finding that district courts are required to make in
order to determine the adequacy of alternative foreign forums when
foreign law or practice is an issue, and, as in the Chevron/Ecuador
litigation, when dismissal is conditional on the alternate forum gain-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant.138 In those circumstances, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that a district court must undertake a full analysis
of the foreign laws or practices relevant to its decision to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds, and closely review all submissions that
are related to the adequacy of the forum.139 The requirement that the
dismissal be conditional serves to protect the non-moving party, and
allows a court to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds even if the
court is unable to make a definitive determination as to the adequacy
of the foreign forum.140 Further, in making the determination, the
court’s justifiable belief in the adequacy of the alternative forum has
been held to be a sufficient basis for granting a conditional dismissal
133 See generally, Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 61; Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 625;
Jota, 157 F.3d at 53.
134 Weston, supra note 116, at 733.
135 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp 2d 534, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
136 Id. at 743.
137 See Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l Ltd. v. State Bank of Pak., 273 F.3d 241,
246 (2d Cir. 2001).
138 See id. at 247.
139 Id. at 248.
140 See Calavo Growers of California, 632 F.2d at 968.
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in favor of a foreign forum.141 However, the Second Circuit held that
even if the court asserts a justifiable belief in the adequacy of the alter-
native forum, it is required to cite to the evidence in the record that
supports this belief, bearing in mind that it is at all times the movant’s
burden to persuade the court of the adequacy of any alternative fo-
rums.142 In essence, the movant must prove that the forum is ade-
quate to such an extent that it gives rise to a justifiable belief on the
part of the court, and in cases when the court has concerns regarding
the accuracy of its justifiable belief, the conditional dismissal serves to
protect the non-moving party.143
The district court, applying the analysis outlined by the Second
Circuit, consulted the U.S. Department of State, Ecuador Country Re-
port on Human Rights Practices for 2000, noting that a primary con-
clusion of the report was that “[t]he most fundamental human rights
abuse in Ecuador stems from shortcomings in its politicized, ineffi-
cient, and corrupt legal and judicial system.”144 Acknowledging the
caution and deference that a U.S. court must exercise in approaching
the question of the independence and impartiality of a foreign court,
the district court reopened the record to receive additional submissions
regarding the adequacy of the court system of Ecuador for adjudicating
the dispute.145
At this point, with the plaintiffs essentially stipulating in dis-
trict court that they were unable to produce material evidence of Tex-
aco’s involvement in the pollution, Texaco, with almost self-destructive
determination, continued to press for transfer of the case to Ecuador,
consenting to in personam jurisdiction in Ecuador, waiving statute of
limitations and accepting service of process in Ecuador.146 This ful-
filled the Second Circuit’s requirement that dismissal be conditional
on Texaco’s submission to in personam jurisdiction. The district court
then outlined its “justifiable belief” in the adequacy of Ecuador as an
alternative forum. While noting that “no one claims the Ecuadorian
judiciary is wholly immune to corruption, inefficiency, or outside pres-
sure,” the district court ultimately decided that Texaco had carried its
burden in proving that Ecuador was an adequate forum, theorizing
that “the courts of Ecuador can exercise, with respect to the parties
and claims here presented, that modicum of independence and impar-
141 See id. at 968 n.6.
142 See Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l Ltd., 273 F.3d at 248.
143 See id.
144 Aguinda, 142 F.Supp 2d at 544 (citing Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (2001), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000 /wha/766.html).
145 See Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
146 Id. at 539.
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tiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum.”147 In what was, in
hindsight, an ill-fated proclamation, the district court stated that
“even the possibility that corruption or undue influence might be
brought to bear if this litigation were pursued in Ecuador seems ex-
ceedingly remote.”148 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs appealed this decision,
but in 2002 the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal
under forum non conveniens, ruling that the lower court’s decision was
not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding repeated arguments by the
plaintiff’s attorneys that Ecuadorian courts were subject to corruption
and incapable of impartiality.149
In 2003, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs re-filed their suit in Ecuador
against Chevron Corporation, which was at that point the successor of
Texaco.150 Despite continuing attempts by the plaintiffs to try the suit
in the media and in the court of public opinion by suggesting that the
suit was about a greedy U.S. corporation taking advantage of the pow-
erless citizens of a smaller country, more facts began to emerge. As
noted above, Texaco was not in fact running rampant and polluting the
land at will; it was simply the minority partner in the oil consortium
run by Petroecuador, which was the actual operator. In fact, Texaco’s
involvement in the project was governed by a concession agreement, in
which all activities were conducted with the oversight and approval of
the Government of Ecuador. Evidence was produced showing that at
the end of the concession agreement, Texaco had conducted the
remediation program as it had been asserting all along, in which pro-
ducing wells and pits formerly utilized by Texaco were closed, pro-
duced water systems were modified, cleared lands were replanted, and
contaminated soil remediated.151 The $40 million remediation pro-
gram began in 1995 and was completed in late summer 1998, and dur-
ing the process, all remediation activities were inspected and certified
by the Ecuadorian government on a site-by-site basis.152 On Septem-
ber 30, 1998, Ecuador’s Minister of Energy and Mines, the President of
Petroecuador and the General Manager of Petroproduccio´n, the oper-
ating division of Petroecuador, signed the “Final Release of Claims and
Delivery of Equipment.”153 This 1998 agreement finalized the govern-
147 Id. at 544–46.
148 Id. at 546.
149 Aguinda., 303 F.3d at 478.




152 Who Signed-Off On Texaco’s Remediation?, AMAZON POST (July 1, 2009), http://
www.theamazonpost.com/news/who-signed-off-on-texaco’s-remediation.
153 Texaco in Ecuador: Remediation, TEXACO, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecua
dor/en/remediation/ (last visited May 16, 2014).
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ment of Ecuador’s approval and certification of Texaco’s environmen-
tal remediation work and stated that Texaco had fully complied with
all obligations established in the remediation agreement signed in
1995. In addition, the municipalities in the area of the drilling opera-
tions signed a negotiated settlement with Texaco that released the
company from any future claims and obligations.154 At the end of the
concession agreement, two independent audits were also conducted to
address the impact of the consortium operations on the soil, water and
air, and assess compliance with environmental laws, regulations and
generally accepted operating practices. Two internationally recognized
consulting firms conducted the audits and each independently con-
cluded that Texaco acted responsibly and that there was no lasting or
significant environmental impact from the former consortium opera-
tions.155 Based on these audits and the remediation efforts, the gov-
ernment of Ecuador subsequently granted Texaco a full release from
any and all environmental liability arising from its operations.156
Under almost any situation, an agreement between a govern-
ment-run company and a corporation would be valid. However, Ecua-
dor, as noted above, has been subject to political and economic turmoil,
and although the country had traditionally been pro-defendant, the
current President of Ecuador has seemingly demonstrated little re-
spect for the country’s legal obligations, whether to private companies
or other nations. Elected in 2006, he began a series of machinations to
consolidate power, and shortly after he took office, proposed a series of
changes to Ecuador’s constitution in order to extend his term in of-
fice.157 Further, when Ecuador defaulted on its payment of global debt
it owed to the World Bank and other international banks, he simply
declared that Ecuador’s national debt was “immoral and illegitimate,”
based on the argument that it had been contracted by prior regimes,
and pledged to fight creditors in international courts, in order to nego-
tiate a reduction in the debt amount.158 Based on the political climate
in Ecuador when the suit was brought, it was seemingly no surprise
that the regime allowed the suit against Chevron to proceed, despite
both the release and the fact that Texaco was a minority consortium
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 CHEVRON CORP., DELIVERING ENERGY NOW DEVELOPING ENERGY FOR THE FU-
TURE: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2008), available at https://web.archive.org/web/
20130407190605/http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/annualreport/Chevron
2008AnnualReport_full.pdf.
157 Joshua Partlow & Stephan Kuffner, Voters in Ecuador Approve Constitution,
WASH. POST, (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/09/28/AR2008092802644.html.
158 Ecuador Defaults on Foreign Debt, BBC (Dec. 13, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/7780984.stm.
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partner, with the government receiving 95% of the profits from produc-
tion.159 However, the suit proceeded against Texaco alone, with the
state-run Petroecuador notably absent from the proceedings, and with
the President of Ecuador consistently calling for Chevron to be subject
to punishment, despite the fact that the current regime still enjoys the
profits from the operations of from Petroecuador, which has continu-
ously drilled in the disputed area even after claims of vast pollution
arose.160
Further, it later came to light that while the forum non con-
veniens suit was proceeding through the U.S. courts, the plaintiff’s at-
torneys had been “working with” Ecuadorian legislators to draft
legislation in preparation for any possible transfer of the case from the
U.S courts to Ecuador.161 The resulting legislation, Ecuador’s Environ-
mental Management Act of 1999, created a private right of action for
the cost of remediation for general environmental harm, laying the
groundwork for the eventual action against Chevron in Ecuador.162 Af-
ter suit was filed in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian court received damage
reports, estimates of the extent of pollution, expert opinions, and even-
tually appointed an “independent global expert,” who provided a mas-
sive report that purportedly assessed the existence and extent of
damages. The report, called the Cabrera Report, accused Texaco em-
ployees of not only widespread pollution, but deforestation and cul-
tural destruction as well, and recommended damages of up to $16
billion.163 Ultimately, on February 15, 2011, after years of litigation in
Ecuador, the court in Ecuador fined Chevron $9.5 billion over the al-
leged pollution, which included a 10 percent legally mandated repara-
tions fee.164
In the midst of the litigation, Chevron attorneys began discov-
ering proof of discrepancies and misrepresentations by the plaintiff’s
attorneys and the court appointed “independent expert” that would
eventually lead Chevron to file fraud, extortion and racketeering
159 History of Texaco and Chevron in Ecuador: Chevron in Ecuador, TEXACO, http:/
/www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/ (last visited May 16, 2014).
160 See generally Mercedes Alvaro, Companies Look to Boost Production at Mature
Oil Fields in Ecuador, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20120201-713643.html.
161 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691-LAK-JCF at 15.
162 Id.
163 Reuters, Report Says Chevron Owes Billions for Ecuadorean Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/business/worldbusiness/
03chevron.html?fta=y&_r=0.
164 Chevron Fined for Amazon Pollution by Ecuador Court, BBC (Feb. 15, 2011,
12:58 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12460333.
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charges against the plaintiff’s American attorney, Steven Donziger.165
Discovery also led to allegations of manipulating the Ecuadorian judi-
ciary and misrepresentations of the testimony of expert witnesses who
testified as to the extent of environmental damages.166 In one of the
earliest discoveries, a typographical error led to the realization that
Donziger’s team fabricated early expert witness reports. In 2004,
Donziger hired Charles Calmbacher, a Georgia-based biologist and en-
vironmental scientist, to help oversee soil and water tests in Ecuador.
Reports signed by Calmbacher, which were submitted to an Ecuado-
rian court in 2005, showed high levels of toxins at two sites and esti-
mated the contamination would cost more than $40 million to clean up
at these sites alone.167 However, Chevron attorneys noticed a typo-
graphical error in some of these reports: the spelling of Calmbacher’s
own name. Chevron attorneys also noticed misspellings of
Calmbacher’s name in letters to the Ecuadorian court asking for an
extension in filing his reports.168 During Calmbacher’s subsequent
deposition, he stated that he had flown back to the U.S. early due to
illness, and had therefore sent pre-signed pages back to Ecuador with
the understanding his findings would be printed over his signature.
However, he stated that the reports that were actually filed with the
Ecuadorian court did not reflect his actual conclusions, maintaining
that he had not seen the final version of the submitted reports until
they were produced during a deposition by Chevron attorneys.169 He
noted while he did find some evidence of contamination, he did not
determine that additional remediation was necessary, and did not cal-
culate clean-up costs, concluding that he did not see significant con-
tamination that posed immediate threat to the environment or to
humans or wildlife.170 His deposition testimony included the state-
ment “I did not reach these conclusions, and I did not write this re-
port.”171 Despite amounting to possible fraud by Donziger, Donziger
made no denial that falsified reports were submitted and offered no
165 See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/
120109fa_fact_keefe?currentPage=all.
166 Chris Dolmetsch & Christie Smythe, Chevron Claims Trial Showed Proof of
Fraud in Ecuador, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2013, 3:35PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-11-26/chevron-claims-trial-showed-proof-of-fraud-in-ecuador
.html.
167 Ben Casselman & Angel Gonzalez, Chevron Suit Data Questioned, WALL ST. J.
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explanation for the falsified reports, other than to state that
Calmbacher’s reports were only a small part of the overall case, and
that other tests have shown contamination at dozens of sites.172
Shortly after these falsified reports were discovered, Chevron
attorneys uncovered evidence suggesting that portions of the Cabrera
Report, which was most likely the justification for the Ecuadorian
court’s judgment against Chevron, may have been actually provided by
the plaintiffs’ attorneys themselves.173 In eleven civil actions across
the United States, Chevron presented this evidence to federal district
judges; judges sitting in Newark, San Diego, Asheville, and Albuquer-
que ruled that the evidence presented appeared to demonstrate fraud
by Donziger, who denied wrongdoing, saying that his “actions were
permissible in Ecuador.”174 Although Cabrera, the purported author of
the report, assured the Ecuadorian court that he was independent and
that the plaintiff’s attorneys had nothing to do with the environmental
assessment or damage recommendations, Chevron had seemingly un-
covered evidence to the contrary. These eleven federal civil actions
were filed in cities in which the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ litigation consul-
tants were based, and materials subpoenaed by Chevron from these
litigation consultants suggest that much of the material from the
Cabrera Report was generated by these litigation consultants.175 A fo-
rensic linguist retained by Chevron filed a report concluding that most
of the Cabrera report was originally written in English, a language
that Cabrera does not speak, and only later translated into Spanish.176
Cabrera, a mining engineer, allegedly recommended damages for “can-
cer deaths,” and “unjust enrichment,” which Chevron claimed would
be unlikely areas of expertise to be evaluated by a mining engineer.177
Eventually plaintiff’s lawyers acknowledged that they indeed provided
significant information to Cabrera, including “proposed findings of fact
and economic valuations for the environmental and other damages
caused by Texaco’s practices and pollution,” and that Cabrera, evi-
172 Id.
173 Roger Parloff, Ecuador Plaintiffs Suffer Setback in Chevron Case, CNN
MONEY, (Oct. 31, 2013), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/10/31/ecuador-
plaintiffs-suffer-setback-in-chevron-case/ (referring to the ghostwritten responses
to its own comments).
174 Roger Parloff, Evidence of Fraud Mounts in Ecuadorian Suit against Chevron,




177 Daniel Fisher, Chevron’s $27 Billion Problem, FORBES, (July 13, 2009), http://
www.forbes.com/part_forbes/2009/0713/texaco-ecuador-pollution-chevrons-27-bil
lion-problem.html.
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 49 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 49 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL303.txt unknown Seq: 36  9-SEP-14 8:51
528 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
dently persuaded by these submissions, had “adopted the proposals,
analyses, and conclusions of the Plaintiffs.”178
Subsequently, Chevron attorneys unearthed a second set of
revelations, possibly even more damning for the plaintiff’s case.
Donziger, attempting to generate public sympathy in the U.S., had a
documentary filmed that would allegedly garner support for the plain-
tiffs and put pressure on Chevron to settle the case. The documentary,
Crude, released in 2009, detailed the legal struggle of the plaintiffs,
and showed interviews from Ecuadorian “experts” and the victims of
Texaco’s alleged pollution. Crude garnered enormous support for the
plaintiffs’ cause, but when Chevron attorneys subpoenaed the out-
takes from the movie, the over 600 hours of edited material once again
provided evidence that Donziger was engaged in a massive fraud.179 It
became clear that the entire movie was orchestrated by Donziger, who
was featured prominently in the film as fighting to protect innocent
Ecuadorian victims against the greed and corruption of a massive
mega-corporation. However, in the outtakes, Donziger was caught on
tape repeatedly expressing disgust for the “utter weakness, corruption,
and lack of integrity” of the Ecuadorian courts.180 In transcripts of the
outtakes, Donziger, speaking with his American litigation consultants,
after they suggested that there was little evidence of widespread pollu-
tion, states “[h]old on a second. . . [T]his is Ecuador. . . . You can say
whatever you want and at the end of the day, there’s a thousand peo-
ple around the courthouse, you’re going to get what you want. Sorry,
but it’s true.” Later he adds, “Because, at the end of the day, this is all
for the court, just a bunch of smoke and mirrors and bullshit. It really
is. We have enough, to get money, to win.”181 In film footage, Donziger
at one point barges into a judge’s chambers and intimidates him into
reversing a ruling the judge had made in Chevron’s favor. The associ-
ated outtake shows Donziger later claiming that this “would never
happen in any judicial system that had integrity.”182
Possibly most damaging to the plaintiffs’ case are outtakes
from the movie showing Donziger and Pablo Fajardo, an Ecuadorian
attorney also representing the plaintiffs, and three litigation consul-
tants, meeting with Cabrera in May of 2007, two weeks before Cabrera
was even officially appointed as “global expert” by the Ecuadorian
court. Attorney Fajardo is shown in the footage presenting a
178 See id. Parloff, supra note 174.
179 Carter Wood, Crude Outtakes Reveal Lies in Trial Lawyers Suit Against Chev-
ron, (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2010/08/crude-outtakes
.php (referring to the documentary-style film).
180 Parloff, supra note 174.
181 See id.
182 See id.
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PowerPoint presentation entitled “Plan for the Global Expert Assess-
ment,” and according to transcripts filed in court, states “[a]nd here is
where we do want the support of our entire technical team, of experts,
scientists, attorneys, political scientists, so that all will contribute to
that report, in other words, you see . . . the work isn’t going to be the
expert’s. All of us bear the burden.”183
In the face of clear and widespread fraud by Donziger, includ-
ing possible fabrication of evidence, and suggestions of the Ecuadorian
judiciary bowing to pressure entirely generated by a campaign by the
plaintiff’s attorneys to manipulate the Ecuadorian court system, it
would seem that attempts to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the
U.S. would have been dismissed immediately. Indeed, in an initial rul-
ing in one of the civil actions noted above, the U.S. Magistrate Judge
in Asheville, North Carolina, stated
While this court is unfamiliar with the practices of the
Ecuadorian judicial system, the court must believe that
the concept of fraud is universal, and that what has bla-
tantly occurred in this matter would in fact be considered
fraud by any court. . . If such conduct does not amount to
fraud in a particular country, then that country has
larger problems than an oil spill.”184
Other courts subsequently sanctioned attorneys associated with the
case: the attorney who had initially filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in
New York, Cristobal Bonifaz, after leaving his role in the original liti-
gation, filed a claim for a separate set of plaintiffs against Chevron in
federal court in San Francisco. The U.S. District Judge subsequently
ordered Bonifaz to pay $45,000 in costs and fees when it was discov-
ered that his plaintiffs did not actually have cancer like the suit
claimed.185 In the face of so much potential evidence of fraud, Manhat-
tan District Court Judge Lewis Kaplan granted Chevron’s motion to
depose Donziger in October 2010, and also compelled Donziger to pro-
duce attorney-client communications.186 Those documents led Chev-
ron to file a civil suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) in February 2011, accusing the Ecuadorian
183 See id.
184 Chevron Corp. v. Camp, No. 1:10MC27, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 30, 2010).
185 Bret Stephens, Amazonian Swindle, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 30, 2007, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119370013621475588.
186 Daniel Fisher, Kaplan Orders Deposition of Attorney Donziger in Chevron Ec-
uador Case, FORBES, (Oct, 21, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2010/10/21/kaplan-orders-deposition-of-attorney-donziger-in-chevron-ecuador-
case/; see also, Fisher, supra note 181.
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plaintiffs and their lawyers of a conspiracy to extort a multibillion-dol-
lar settlement from Chevron.187
However, the suit against Chevron in Ecuador continued to
progress through the appeals process there, and the Ecuadorian Court
of Appeals eventually affirmed the multi-billion dollar judgment
against Chevron, in part because Chevron had failed to “make a public
apology.”188 Despite the evidence of widespread fraud in Ecuador,
Chevron found it difficult to get resolution in U.S. courts regarding the
disposition of the Ecuadorian judgment. However, once the judgment
was affirmed in Ecuador, Chevron immediately sought a declaratory
judgment that the Ecuadorian judgment was unenforceable, and
sought protection under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
Article 53, which governs the recognition of money judgments imposed
in foreign countries.189 In March 2011, in response to the evidence
presented by Chevron, Judge Kaplan issued an injunction to block en-
forcement of the judgment on a worldwide basis.190 However, this in-
junction was voided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in January
of 2012, in a unanimous decision by the three-judge panel, who noted
that Chevron could only challenge the judgment’s validity defensively,
in response to attempted enforcement, and that the Ecuadorian plain-
tiffs had not yet undertaken enforcement anywhere, and might never
undertake in enforcement in New York.191 However, the Court of Ap-
peals stated that granting the type of “speculative” relief sought by
Chevron would “unquestionably provoke extensive friction between le-
gal systems” by encouraging challenges in New York to the legitimacy
of courts in foreign countries.192 Furthermore, the Court noted that
Article 53 and the common-law principles that it encapsulated were
motivated by an interest to provide for the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, not to prevent them, and to rule in Chevron’s favor would “turn
that framework on its head.”193
More recently, these questions regarding the enforcement of
Ecuador’s judgment in the United States and the effect on interna-
187 Amy Kolz, The Complete Game, AM. LAWYER, at ¶ 7-10 (Jan. 2012).
188 Braden Reddall & Eduardo Garcia, Chevron Appeals $18 Billion Ruling in Ec-
uador Lawsuit, REUTERS, (Jan. 20, 2012,), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/
20/us-chevron-idUSTRE80J1ZJ20120120.
189 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5302 (Consol. 2014).
190 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated
sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 11-1150-CV L, 2011 WL4375022 (2d Cir. Sept.
19, 2011) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 2012).
191 Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 423, 184 L. Ed.2d 288 (U.S. 2012).
192 See id.
193 See id. at 241.
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tional comity have taken a back seat to rulings in Chevron’s 2011
RICO suit filed against Donziger in the same Manhattan court. Origi-
nally, the RICO suit focused on allegations that Donziger and the con-
sultants retained by the plaintiffs authored portions of the Cabrera
Report, the report that was provided to the Ecuadorian Court in as-
sessing the existence and extent of pollution in the disputed area and
on which the judgment against was based.194 However, it was soon
revealed that the entire Cabrera Report had been written and provided
by the Stratus Company, a Boulder, Colorado consulting firm Donziger
hired.195 Over the years, Donziger had represented to both Ecuadorian
and U.S. courts, the media, and the public that Cabrera, the Ecuado-
rian court-appointed global expert, had been the author of the re-
port.196 Stratus, a co-defendant in the RICO suit, settled the lawsuit
with Chevron and disavowed its work in the Chevron suit, stating that
its work had been “fatally tainted” by Donziger, and that the Cabrera
Report was “not reliable.”197 These revelations soon paled in the face of
testimony by one of the presiding Ecuadorian judges that he had been
bribed in order to rule against Chevron based on the ghostwritten
Cabrera Report.198 The former judge, Alberto Guerra, testified that he
was paid thousands of dollars by attorneys for the plaintiffs to rule
against Chevron, and that two of the presiding Ecuadorian judges
were each promised $500,000 from the proceeds of the Chevron judg-
ment.199 In the face of the evidence advanced in the RICO trial against
Donziger, Judge Kaplan recently issued a ruling that can only be con-
sidered a major setback for the plaintiff’s case, holding that the mone-
tary judgment against Chevron was a product of bribery, fraud and
racketeering perpetrated by Donziger.200 In a 485-page opinion, Judge
Kaplan did not rule on whether pollution occurred in the disputed area
as a result of Texaco’s operations, but did find that the plaintiff’s legal
team, led by Donziger, engaged in widespread bribery, conspiracy, and
194 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
195 Roger Parloff, Judge: $9.5 Billion Ecuadorean Judgment against Chevron was
Product of Bribery (March 15, 2014), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2014/03
/05/judge-9-5-billion-ecuadorian-verdict-against-chevron-was-product-of-bribery/.
196 See id.
197 Daniel Fisher, Plaintiffs’ Expert Disavows Evidence in Chevron Ecuador Case,
Says Process ‘Fatally Tainted,’ FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2013/04/11/plaintiffs-expert-disavows-evidence-in-chevron-ecuador-
case-says-process-fatally-tainted/.
198 Christie Smythe, Ecuador Judge Testifies That He Was Bribed to Rule Against
Chevron, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-
10-23/ecuador-judge-testifies-he-was-bribed-to-rule-in-chevron-case.
199 See id.
200 Parloff, supra note 196.
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obstruction of justice, and barring Donziger and his associated from
profiting from the “egregious fraud that occurred.201
After a twenty-year legal battle and possibly hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in legal fees, the ruling by Judge has seemingly galva-
nized Chevron, which is pursuing Donziger and his associates with all
of its legal might, and is now suing him for $32 million in legal fees
resulting from the successful RICO case against him.202 Once viewed
as a tenacious maverick who was something akin to a hero for going up
against a gigantic multinational corporation, Donziger is now on the
defensive, challenging the legitimacy of the most recent district court
ruling, calling the court proceedings it “deeply flawed,” and claiming to
be the victim of a “well-funded corporate retaliation campaign.”203
However, Chevron claims it is trying to hold Donziger accountable for
bringing a fraudulent lawsuit against the company.204 Aside from
seeking legal fees from Donziger, Chevron is seeking to bring suits
against others involved in facilitating the Ecuador litigation as well.205
On March 14, 2014, a Judge sitting in Gibraltar held that Chevron can
proceed in a tort suit against Russ DeLeon, Harvard Law classmate of
Donziger, and online-poker tycoon.206 Chevron alleges that DeLeon
helped pay for the documentary Crude, and invested millions in the
litigation in Ecuador, which Chevron claim eventually became a racke-
teering conspiracy. According to evidence, Deleon was entitled to col-
lect $600 million if Chevron paid the judgment, and the Gibraltar
Court found at least a prima facie case that DeLeon and his funding
vehicle were “fully involved in the conspiracy, continuing to fund it
well after they were aware of fraudulent activities.”207 Further, on
March 31, 2014, Chevron brought fraud charges against Patton Boggs,
201 See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF 126, at 478.
202 Paul M. Barrett, In Pollution Case, Chevron Seeks $32 Million from Plaintiffs’
Lawyer Donziger, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2014-03-20/in-pollution-case-chevron-seeks-32-million-from-plaintiffs-law
yer-donziger.
203 Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/federal-judge-rules-
for-chevron-in-ecuadorean-pollution-case.html.
204 Nate Raymond, Chevron Seeks $32 Million in Legal Fees in Ecuador Case,
REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-chevron-
ecuador-idUSBREA2I1PS20140319.
205 See id.
206 Chevron v. DeLeon, Supreme Court of Gibraltar, 2012-C-232 1-2, 4 (2014),
available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1088097-2014-03-14-gi
braltar-judgment.html.
207 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: The Noose Tightens on Chevron Lit-
igation Backers, AM. LAWYER (Mar. 24, 2014), available at http://www.ameri-
canlawyer.com/id=1202648169924/The-Global-Lawyer:-The-Noose-Tightens-on-
Chevron-Litigation-Backers?slreturn=20140323141053.
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a Washington D.C. law firm, that the plaintiffs hired in an attempt to
collect the judgment from Chevron.208 Chevron claims that attorneys
at Patton Boggs had knowledge that the Cabrera Report was written
by Donziger’s consultants at Stratus, and misled both the court and
public about the report’s origin; in essence claiming that Patton Boggs
not only had knowledge of, but furthered the racketeering conspiracy
against Chevron.209 On May 7, 2014 Patton Boggs agreed to pay Chev-
ron $15 million to settle the fraud allegations, and agreed to cooperate
with Chevron in discovery related to the case, while expressing regret
over its involvement in the matter.210
VIII. CHEVRON/ECUADOR UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The high-profile nature of the case, and the subsequent Ecua-
dorian judgment seemingly squarely implicates application the inter-
national due process analysis. Because the March 2014 ruling did not
consider the actual question of the existence of, or Chevron’s responsi-
bility for, pollution in the Lago Agrio oilfield region, the litigation will
most likely continue to wind its way the Ecuadorian and U.S. court
systems. Although the allegations of fraud and bribery overshadow the
entire litigation, the case it has the potential to clarify the interna-
tional due process doctrine and judges’ roles in affecting foreign policy
in the foreign judgment recognition and enforcement context. As
stated earlier, the international due process analysis, as applied in
these cases, may violate separation of powers principles because it re-
quires courts to pass judgments on other countries, and so allows
courts to actively engage in international politics, and their holdings
must then be followed by lower courts considering similar claims.211
As noted, Judge Posner held that the court may divide countries into
two categories, “civilized countries” and “uncivilized countries.”212
Where countries were effectively considered “uncivilized” by the
courts, meaning that they did not provide for impartial tribunals or
208 Casey Sullivan, N.Y. Judge Lets Chevron Bring Fraud Claims against Patton
Boggs, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/chev
ron-lawsuit-idUSL1N0MS14420140331.
209 Daniel Fisher, Chevron’s Next Target: Patton Boggs, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/03/31/chevrons-next-target-washing
ton-law-firm-patton-boggs/.
210 Steven Mufson, Chevron, Patton Boggs Settle their Epic Legal Battle over Jun-




211 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1206.
212 Soc’y of Lloyds v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 481 (7th Cir. 2000).
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procedures compatible with due process of law, the courts are comfort-
able passing judgment on those countries and finding that the judg-
ments at issue were unenforceable. In the “uncivilized country” cases,
the courts essentially ignored the individual proceedings that resulted
in the foreign judgment and instead looked to “evidence” regarding the
quality of the foreign judicial system and the U.S. judges’, sometimes
personal, perceptions of those countries. Notably, one of these “uncivi-
lized country” cases was recently decided by the Southern District of
Florida. In Osorio v. Dole Food Co., the court refused to recognize and
enforce a $97 million Nicaraguan judgment for several reasons, one of
which was that the Nicaraguan judicial system did not comport with
the concept of international due process.213 The plaintiffs in the Dole
case were represented by Los Angeles-based attorney Juan Domin-
guez. Examining the Nicaraguan court system that handled the origi-
nal suits by the plaintiffs, the California Court refused to recognize the
Nicaraguan judgment, “[i]n view of the persuasive evidence that direct
political interference and judicial corruption in Nicaragua is wide-
spread.”214 The court was careful to note that its decision was based on
the overall Nicaraguan judicial system, “not the particulars of this
case.”215
The Chevron/Ecuador litigation could ultimately assist in fur-
ther developing the parameters of the international due process analy-
sis. In the 2000 remand to the District Court of the Southern District
of New York, Judge Rakoff examined the appropriateness of Ecuado-
rian court system in the forum non conveniens analysis, noting that
the events in Ecuador had “revived lingering questions about the abil-
ity of the Ecuadorian courts to dispense independent, impartial justice
in these cases.”216 Significantly, Judge Rakoff consulted an annual re-
port produced by the U.S. State Department that undertakes to assess
“whether the judicial institutions of various nations provide at least a
modicum of fundamental fairness to litigants.”217 One of the primary
conclusions of the report, entitled The Country Report for Ecuador,
U.S. Department of State, Ecuador Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1998, dated February 26, 1999, found that “[t]he most
fundamental human rights abuse [in Ecuador] stems from shortcom-
ings in [its] politicized, inefficient, and corrupt legal and judicial sys-
tem.”218 However, as noted above, the Second Circuit had held that it
213 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d. sub
nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2011).
214 Id. at 1351.
215 See id.
216 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 93 CIV. 7527 (TSR), 2000 WL 122143 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
31, 2000).
217 See id. at 2.
218 See id.
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remains the burden of the movants to demonstrate the adequacy of the
proposed forum in a forum non conveniens analysis, and so Judge
Rakoff invited the Chevron litigants themselves to submit briefs on
the fairness of the Ecuadorian courts in order to assess whether a fair
trial might be obtained there.219
During subsequent proceedings to determine the enforceability
of the Ecuadorian judgment, Judge Kaplan noted that the case was
“extraordinary,” not only because of the staggering amount of money
at stake but also because Chevron had raised serious arguments about
“the fairness and integrity of the judicial system of Ecuador,” thus im-
plicating “considerations of international comity.”220 An important
point at issue in the 2011 district court proceedings was whether
Chevron was likely to have been successful on the merits with respect
to its claim that the Ecuadorian judicial system does not comport with
the international concept of due process.221 In his ruling, Judge
Kaplan noted, “there is abundant evidence before the Court that Ecua-
dor has not provided impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with due process of law, at least in the time period relevant here and
especially in cases such as this.”222 The District Court considered evi-
dence of Ecuador’s deficiencies of judicial process as reported in the
“Alvarez Report” prepared by Vladimiro Alvarez Grau.223 Alvarez, ac-
cording to the Court, was a highly credentialed and experienced attor-
ney from Ecuador who had practiced law in Ecuador for over 40 years
and had held various prominent posts there, including as an elected
official and legal academic.224 In an overview of the Ecuadoran politi-
cal and judicial systems, Alvarez focused in particular on the relevant
time period for the Chevron litigation, which was between 2003 when
the lawsuit in Ecuador began and 2011 when the monetary judgment
was entered by the Ecuadorian provincial court.225 Based on the report
the Court noted that the judicial system in Ecuador was already
“troubled” when socialist President Rafael Correa, who publicly sup-
ported the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ claims, rose to power. The judiciary
had been in a “state of severe institutional crisis” for a long time and
had recently “deteriorated.”226 Judge Kaplan found that President
Correa had heavily influenced the judicial system in this case, and
that he “interfered in matters that were pending before the judiciary
219 See id. at 3.
220 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F.Supp.2d at 595.
221 See id. at 584.
222 See id. at 633.
223 See id. at 633–34.
224 Id. at 616 n.163.
225 Id. at 635, n.305.
226 Id. at 616.
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and that were of particular interest Ecuadorian government.”227 Ac-
cording to Judge Kaplan, in “a number of recent cases, judges have
been threatened with violence, removed, and/or prosecuted when they
ruled against the government’s interests.”228 Also relevant to Judge
Kaplan’s determination was the fact that a number of independent
commentators lamented the state of affairs in Ecuador, and concluded
that there was no respect for the rule of law, and that there was no
independent judiciary.229 However, Judge Kaplan also looked to
sources such as World Bank and U.S. State Department documents,
which supported these findings.230 In 2009, the World Bank gave Ec-
uador a low ranking for respect for the rule of law; and the U.S. State
Department recognized that there were times when the judges in Ec-
uador decided cases on the basis of outside influences, particularly
when dealing with matters of interest to the government.231 Taken in
the aggregate, the judicial system in Ecuador seemed scarcely more
than a political tool used to accomplish the goals of the government
without regard to an evenhanded or just application of the law, when
the judge rendered the Chevron judgment.
Immediately after Judge Kaplan’s 2011 decision, the Ecuado-
rian ambassador to Washington launched a defense of his country’s
judicial system, taking issue with Judge Kaplan’s conclusions and ex-
pressed “consternation that a U.S. court has elected to pass judgment
on Ecuador’s courts.”232 In response to Judge Kaplan’s assertion that
“here is abundant evidence before the court that Ecuador has not pro-
vided impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of
law,” the Ambassador claimed that the Judge’s opinion “does not accu-
rately reflect upon or credit the independence of the Ecuadorian judici-
ary.”233 However, Judge Kaplan seems to have given some weight to
external guidance such as the Country Report from the U.S Depart-
ment of State, and so may have a strong justification for his evaluation
of the foreign court system. A systematic approach in evaluating the
court system of another country, which is based on guidance from the
Executive Branch, seems more likely to withstand scrutiny than an
approach that is based on the determination based solely on the
judge’s perceptions. While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ulti-
mately overturned Judge Kaplan’s decision because of the far reaching
227 Id. at 618.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 619.
230 Id. at 620.
231 Id.
232 Lawrence Hurley, Ecuador’s U.S. Ambassador Speaks out on Chevron Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/
10/10greenwire-ecuadors-us-ambassador-speaks-out-on-chevron-c-86771.html.
233 Id.
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nature of his global injunction on the enforcement of the Ecuadorian
court’s judgment, the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the purpose of the
Recognition Act seems to serve as a clear reminder of the restraint and
delicacy that comity principles would warrant in politically charged
transnational cases such as this.234 Unlike the forum non conveniens
analysis, in which the judge may rely on arguments from the litigants
themselves to determine the adequacy of a foreign forum, it would
seem that judges performing the international due process analysis
should seek external guidance from other branches, and rely solely on
that guidance when determining the adequacy of a foreign court sys-
tem. Limiting the analysis to external guidance from the other
branches may serve as the most appropriate method to make these
determinations, and allow judges to avoid the implication that their
determination might be colored by personal perceptions. This method
has allowed courts to sidestep concerns regarding comity in the
past.235
Judge Kaplan applied the international due process analysis in
his March 2014 opinion in the RICO case against Donziger. Basing his
analysis in part on the language of the Restatement (Third) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States, Judge Kaplan noted that
“United States courts may not give comity to or recognize the judg-
ment of a foreign state if ‘the judgment was rendered under a judicial
system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures com-
patible with due process of law.’”236 Noting that “Courts essentially
are tasked with one question: whether the foreign procedures are “fun-
damentally fair” and “do not offend against basic fairness,” Judge
Kaplan remarked on the delicate nature of this determination, stating
that “the Court is far from eager to pass judgment as to the fairness of
the judicial system of another country, but it of course is obliged to do
so.”237 For a second time in a ruling, Judge Kaplan examined the writ-
ings of Grau regarding the state of the Ecuadorian courts, and based
his opinion partly on that evidence, as well as Donziger’s statements
that the Ecuadorian judiciary lacked integrity, and the U.S. State De-
partments Human Rights Reports, Judge Kaplan held that “the judi-
cial system was not fair or impartial and did not comport with the
requirements of due process. The Ecuadorian decisions therefore are
not entitled to recognition here.”238
234 Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 242–43 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied
133 S. Ct. 423, 184 L. Ed. 2d 288 (2012).
235 See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2000).
236 See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF 126, at 417.
237 Id. at 418 & n.1585.
238 Id. at 419.
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After the Chevron/Ecuador litigation, the question that re-
mains is whether the international due process analysis gives rise to
more problems than it solves. Going forward, it seems counterproduc-
tive to insist that the judiciary be required to examine the entire judi-
cial system of a foreign country, when it should perhaps more properly
examine claims that individual proceedings violate due process. It may
be argued that the international due process analysis required that
Judge Kaplan reach beyond his constitutionally delineated role and
engage in a foreign affairs-based analysis that is beyond the compe-
tence of state and federal judges.239 As noted above, it is quite possible
that the analysis requires action that is unsuitable for judges, who are
responsible for settling disputes between individual parties, but not
for formulating international policies or engaging in a type of decision
making in which the Executive Branch should engage.240 As evidenced
by the fact that the Ambassador for a foreign sovereign was compelled
to defend his country’s judiciary based on the ruling of a U.S. judge,
this analysis may give rise to foreign affairs complications outside the
purview of the judiciary. The international due process analysis in a
published opinion in a high-profile case such as Chevron/Ecuador
forces the judiciary to make judgments that may be construed as a
condemnation of a country’s entire government. Further, the court’s
decision might certainly generate “consternation” to the extent that it
complicated foreign relations. It is not hard to imagine that after the
Ecuadorian Ambassador had been forced to defend his country’s judi-
cial system in the media, that our own ambassadors would have been
expelled from the Ecuador had there still been ambassadors remaining
in the country.241
A ruling based on particular proceedings, rather than a ruling
based on the fairness of a foreign court system as a whole might better
shield U.S. Courts from entanglement with foreign concerns. In es-
sence, the balancing test that should be used to determine the validity
of foreign judgments is one that is not unfamiliar to jurisprudence, as
it is the one originally found in Hilton v. Guyot, in which the Supreme
Court specifically contemplated a due process analysis that would in-
volve an individualized assessment of the foreign proceedings to deter-
mine if they were fundamentally fair.242 The Hilton Court established
the test, and it is only a vagary of time and judicial fiat that completely
altered the considerations to the extent that the mandatory exception
would become the benchmark. Examining the elements of the Hilton
239 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1205.
240 Id.
241 See Paul Richter, Ecuador Expels U.S. Ambassador, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/06/world/la-fg-ecuador-ambassador-20110406.
242 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113.
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decision may clarify this assertion. The court noted that “[W]e are sat-
isfied that[:]. . .[firstly,] where there has been opportunity for a full
and fair trial abroad before a [foreign] court of competent jurisdic-
tion. . .” speaks directly to the requirement of a “full and fair trial.”243
A plain reading of this sentence would seem to indicate that the state-
ment covers both the specific proceedings and the general court system
of the foreign jurisdiction. The sentence “full and fair trial” would seem
to speak to the individual proceedings, and “before a foreign court of
competent jurisdiction” would speak to the general validity of the for-
eign court system. To argue that “opportunity for a full and fair trial”
references only opportunities for impartial trials generally or periodi-
cally seems illogical, as it would be so ambiguous as to allow almost
any judgment to stand. Under this line of reasoning a foreign state
that historically gave the opportunity for a fair trial that had recently
been taken over by a dictatorship might qualify as having given the
opportunity for a full and fair trial. It would appear that U.S. courts
must look at individual proceedings to some extent to measure
whether a foreign court generally affords due process rights. As it
stands, presiding U.S. judges have to research the current political
system of countries on a case-by-case basis before it could be consid-
ered in evaluating judgments. If judges are free to determine the fair-
ness of an entire foreign court system based on judicial discretion, it
would seem that the particular proceedings in the original judgment
court would be some of the most appropriate evidence by which to de-
termine the fairness of the foreign system. If not, what is the evidence
that should be used, and are the individual members of the judiciary
the appropriate parties to be making these value judgments? The anal-
ysis, as it stands, does not seem to operate under guidelines that are
clear enough to actually aid judges in making these determinations.
Secondly, the Hilton Court’s requirement of “conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings” can speak only to the individual pro-
ceedings.244 This mandates an evaluation of the general court proce-
dures balanced against the particulars of the specific trial at issue, and
further requires an examination of whether the trial took place “after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant.”245 It seems
plain that this requirement mandates examining the fulfillment of the
due process requirements of the individual proceedings. The Hilton
court clearly spoke to the system as a whole when it looks to “a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries,”
but the following sentence examines whether “there is nothing to show
243 Id. at 202.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect.”246
This directly asks the court to consider reasons why these particular
proceedings should not be enforced, as long as the court system itself
offers the opportunity for the fair administration of justice.
The Hilton court next provided the balance, when it noted that
the merits should not be tried anew, as on a new trial or on appeal,
simply because the debtor asserts some mistake of law or fact.247 This
seems to caution the court to limit the examination of the individual
proceedings to ensure only that they meet the minimum standards of
fairness and due process, but in no way should this be construed to
advocate turning a blind eye to the fairness of the individual proceed-
ings, or focusing only on the foreign court system as a whole at the
expense of examining the possibility of fraud in the individual proceed-
ings. Examinations of the individual proceedings are not analyses that
are outside the bounds of the court’s competence. On a daily basis,
courts are called on to balance the actions of governmental or private
interests against individual rights that might be abridged by these ac-
tions, and to balance the asserted interests against the burdens of pro-
viding adequate due process. However, analyzing entire judicial and
political systems in lieu of examining claims of fraud or due process
violations during particular proceedings should be outside the realm of
the judiciary.
Judge Kaplan noted that the Chevron case was remarkable be-
cause of the extent to which it implicated comity.248 However, if the
international due process analysis can be said to have its foundation in
furthering the aims of comity, it may be failing on that front also. Com-
ity does not seem to be served when the lack of integrity of the Judici-
ary or the interference of the country’s President in the judicial process
are brought to light in a judicial proceeding.249 Had Judge Kaplan is-
sued the injunction based on evidence of pervasive fraud by the plain-
tiff’s attorney, after a careful examination of the individual
proceedings and without reference to the fairness of the Ecuadorian
court system, it certainly would have promoted comity more efficiently
than pointing out the flaws in another country’s entire judicial system.
If the injunction had been based on the individual proceedings, Ecua-
dor would have been hard pressed to seriously implicate concerns of
comity, because, as the Magistrate Judge in North Carolina noted,
“the court must believe that the concept of fraud is universal, and that
246 Id.
247 Id. at 203.
248 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F.Supp.2d at 595.
249 Id. at 617.
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what has blatantly occurred in this matter would in fact be considered
fraud by any court.”250 If comity is the concern, examining individual
proceedings would allow Ecuador to save face by categorizing cases as
an isolated abuse of discretion, and preserve the reputation of its judi-
ciary as a whole. As in the Dole case, there is no reason to implicate
another country’s entire judicial system if the interests of comity un-
derlie foreign relations, because in like fashion, the plaintiff’s attor-
neys in Dole were eventually discovered to have engaged in such
massive fraud that they were recommended for criminal charges by a
state Supreme Court Judge in California.251
A finding that an entire country’s judicial system is fundamen-
tally unfair is far broader than a judgment regarding a particular act
of the government, or indeed, particular acts of the litigants. In some
respects, the refusal to enforce the judgments of another country, be-
cause of a judicial determination that the entire country’s court system
is subject to political influence or bias, is far more troubling than a
decision in a particular case that a specific foreign official acted unlaw-
fully. Such a far-reaching opinion would seem to be more appropriately
made by the Executive Branch. To avoid implicating the judiciary in
foreign affairs, Professor Carodine suggests changing the existing due
process analysis to shift the determination that a foreign country’s
judgments are not worthy of enforcement to the Executive Branch,
which could possibly outline its decisions in a format similar to the
U.S. State Department Country Reports.252 These determinations
would control enforcement of judgments rendered in that country,
rather than determinations by the judiciary. However, if a country
renders a judgment that was not on the list, and was subsequently
sought to be enforced in the United States, then courts would only
then consider whether the court in the foreign proceedings at issue
afforded the litigants due process in those particular proceedings.253
This would promote judicial efficiency by serving as a gatekeeping
mechanism, precluding judgments from countries with questionable
court systems from being enforced through U.S. courts altogether, and
shielding U.S. courts from political controversy.
Claims that the international due process analysis furthers the
goal of “judicial efficiency” may be subject to question when one looks
at cases like Ashenden, or Chevron/Ecuador, which has tied up the
250 Chevron Corp. v. Camp, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2010)
(ordering that discovery be allowed).
251 Martha Neil, Dole Gets Legal Fees as Calif. Judge Details Attorneys’ Fraud on
Court, A.B.A. J. (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/
article/dole_gets_legal_fees_as_calif._judge_details_massive_attorney_fraud_on_
cour/.
252 Carodine, supra note 20, at 1224.
253 Id. at 1225.
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courts for decades. Proponents of the analysis would most likely be
hard pressed to point to instances where the analysis resulted in
quicker resolution of cases, or avoided protracted litigation, and as
transnational litigation becomes more frequent as we move to a global
society, it may be wiser to change the analysis. Judgments from coun-
tries with courts that do not provide due process in proceedings, as
determined by the Executive Branch, would not be entitled to recogni-
tion by U.S. courts. Judgments from countries that generally provide
due process, as determined by the Executive Branch, could be made,
subject to review, upon allegations of specific instances of due process
violations. These reviews would be confined to examining only the due
process violations complained of, and nothing more.
As it stands, the proposal that the international due process
analysis prevents parties from re-litigating in the U.S. court system is
questionable at best, when examined in the light of Chevron/Ecuador.
The argument that forcing courts to review individual proceedings
would result in shifting the risks and costs from the entity that chose
to enter into transactions with foreign entities to the U.S. courts is also
subject to challenge. If the Executive Branch were to unequivocally
state that certain countries were of a category that their judgments
were unenforceable, then there would be no risk or costs to the courts,
as judgments rendered by those countries would be precluded from
U.S. courts completely. If litigants in countries with court systems that
were not at all implicated by the Executive Branch complained of due
process violations, courts would only then be obliged to determine
whether due process was provided. For example, if the U.S. had placed
Ecuador in the list of countries whose judgments were not recognized
in the United States, the Chevron plaintiffs would most likely not have
wasted time seeking enforcement in the U.S., and the court system
would have avoided over two decades of legal wrangling by the parties.
Alternately, if Ecuador was of the category of countries whose judg-
ments were recognized, the overwhelming evidence of fraud in these
individual proceedings may have led to the complaint being dismissed
much more quickly.
Rather than promoting judicial efficiency, the international
due process analysis seems to impose an even greater burden on judi-
cial resources. A quick review of the Ashenden opinion, as well as mul-
tiple Chevron opinions demonstrates that courts are unlikely to ignore
the individual proceedings and rule only on the court system of the
judgment court alone. In order to understand the framework for the
judgment rendered in the foreign court, both the general court system
of the country where the judgment was rendered and the particular
proceedings are examined, in almost excruciating detail. To suggest
that the retail approach is not viable seems to have missed the mark,
as judges are seemingly compelled to examine both the retail and
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wholesale nature of the proceedings before them, which does not lead
to judicial efficiency. For example, after reviewing the facts, Judge
Kaplan rendered his March 2014 ruling in a 485-page opinion with
1,842 citations.254 The international due process comprised the
equivalent of three pages out of the entire opinion.255 If – as Judge
Kaplan pointed out, based on the wording of the Restatement (Third) –
because the “judicial system was not fair or impartial,” the decisions of
Ecuador are “not entitled to recognition here,”256 the entire case could
have been resolved in a few sentences. However, the analysis does not
seem to be effective at lightening the workload of the already
overburdened court system by avoiding a retrial of the initial claims
litigated in the foreign court.
Further, utilizing the international due process analysis in a
high-profile case may lead to increased attempts to try a case in the
media or in the court of public opinion. For example, in his March 2014
ruling, Judge Kaplan noted that Donziger was a “master of public and
media relations” and that “an extensive public relations and media
campaign has been part of his strategy.”257 This has proven to be true
even after Judge Kaplan’s ruling. In a recent article, in an attempt to
continue to garner support from the public, Donziger was booked to
speak at his alma-mater, Harvard Law School, where it has been sug-
gested that he was “tak[ing] his case to the Ivy League Court of Ap-
peal”258 Despite Judge Kaplan’s careful review of caselaw and the
facts in a nearly 500-page opinion, in promoting Donziger’s appear-
ance at Harvard, the Human Rights Program at Harvard claimed that
Chevron secured “a controversial ruling from a U.S. federal judge in a
non-jury trial that Ecuador’s entire judicial system is unworthy of re-
spect, and that the case was marred by fraud.”259 Focusing on the in-
ternational due process analysis contained on 3 out of the entire 485
pages of Judge Kaplan’s opinion, the promoters of Donziger’s speech
may have been attempting to suggest that the ruling was made with-
out consideration of Donziger’s fraud as the primary factor. Judge
Kaplan himself noted that he was “obligated” to pass judgment of the
“fairness of the judicial system of another country.”260 However, this
254 See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF 1, at 485.
255 Id. at 417–19.
256 Id. at 419.
257 Id.
258 Paul M. Barrett, Attorney Deemed a “Racketeer” Takes His Case to Harvard
Law, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2014-03-26/attorney-deemed-a-racketeer-takes-his-case-to-harvard-law.
259 The Future of Corporate Impact Litigation After the Chevron Case, HUMAN
RIGHTS PROGRAM WEBSITE, http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/events/the-future-of-corpo
rate-impact-litigation-after-the-chevron-case/.
260 See Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF 1, at 418.
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obligation may subject an otherwise thorough and thoughtful opinion
to suggestions that it was rendered by a judge with profound disre-
spect for an entire country’s judicial system. In fact, Donziger has
vowed to appeal Judge Kaplan’s decision, calling the ruling “appal-
ling”, and claiming that Judge Kaplan has let his “implacable hostility
towards. . . [Donziger’s] Ecuadorian clients and their country infect his
view of the case.”261 It is unlikely that omitting the requirement of
performing the international due process analysis in the March 2014
ruling would have prevented from Donziger’s resulting claims of bias
on the part of Judge Kaplan.262 However, omitting the international
due process analysis and focusing only on the particular allegations of
fraud by Donziger may have shielded Judge Kaplan from claims that
he “made disparaging remarks about Ecuador’s judicial system,”263 or
that he found “Ecuador’s entire judicial system is unworthy of
respect.”264
The Chevron litigation is remarkable for a number of reasons,
as Judge Kaplan noted, not the least of which is that it highlights
problems with existing international due process analysis in its cur-
rent form. In the face of overwhelming evidence of fraud on the part of
the plaintiffs, it is possible that Judge Kaplan could have disposed of
the case without implicating the Ecuadorian court system at all. As
the litigation continues to wind its way through the appeals process,
the sheer drama of the case overshadows questions regarding the U.S.
judiciary’s role in foreign affairs, how comity may best be furthered
when enforcing foreign judgments, and the appropriateness of the ju-
diciary evaluating the reputation of a foreign sovereign’s courts. Hope-
fully, the boundaries of the international due process analysis will be
clarified, as well as the role of U.S. judges in navigating the controver-
sial international political issues that are implicated in foreign judg-
ment recognition cases will be more fully defined.
261 Larry Neumeister, In Ecuador Pollution Case, New York Judge Rules for Chev-
ron, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/04/
ecuador-pollution-case-new-york_n_4896293.html.
262 Steven Donziger, Why Judge Kaplan’s Decision is Unlikely to Survive Appeal




264 See HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM WEBSITE, supra note 314.
